



Does transparency come at the cost of charitable services?  
Evidence from investigating British charities1 
Canh Thien Dang 
Department of Economics,  
London School of Economics, UK  
c.t.dang@lse.ac.uk  
Trudy Owens 
School of Economics,  
University of Nottingham, UK 
Trudy.Owens@nottingham.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Recent high-profile scandals related to misuse of funding and donations have 
raised the demand for scrutiny over financial transparency and operational activities 
of non-profit organizations in developed countries. Our analysis challenges the 
common practice in the sector of using programme ratios and overhead costs as 
indicators for non-profit accountability. Using Benford's Law to measure irregularities 
in financial data for a large sample of public charities we estimate that 25% of the 
sample potentially misreport their financial information. We show theoretically and 
empirically that charities with a higher programme ratio (their level of spending on 
charitable activities), will be less likely to misreport their financial information only 
when their overhead costs (spending on governing activities) are also sufficiently high. 
Tighter monitoring becomes ineffective in increasing the sectoral transparency and 
accountability unless accompanied by a sufficiently high level of charitable spending. 
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“Transparency is great, but not at the cost of a charity’s services.” 
(Asheem Singh, Director of the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations,  
The Guardian, 2015) 
1 Introduction  
Misrepresenting financial information has become a serious concern in the non-profit sector in 
developed countries.1 The disconnection between the funders and the end beneficiaries has 
given non-profits ample opportunities and incentives to manipulate their financial reports to 
mislead potential donors, rating agencies, and the public about their efficiency in 
accomplishing philanthropic missions. We revisit a heated debate on the role of information 
transparency, and the trade-off between the cost of accountability and the spending on 
charitable activities. We investigate whether organisations with higher performance metrics 
(such as higher spending on charitable activities) report their financial data more accurately, 
and whether increased governance-related overhead costs (another commonly used 
performance metric) correlates with a lower level of financial misinformation.  
 We first explore an alternative method of measuring performance based on Benford’s 
Law to quantify misreporting in financial data for public charities in the UK.2 The intuition is 
that the observed distribution of the first digits of these figures is expected to follow a 
theoretical distribution known as the Benford distribution.3,4 The further the observed 
distribution deviates from the Benford distribution, the more likely the financial figures in the 
financial statement include non-random errors, either due to manipulation or human error. 
Using a large public dataset of over 10,000 NPOs in the UK, our preferred test finds that nearly 
25% of the sample potentially misreported their financial accounts during the period 2007-
2015. We then cross-check our measures with reports by the Charity Commission, the 
governing body of charities in England and Wales. Our analysis correctly identifies 90% of the 
charities recently (2016) charged for misusing their funding and tinkering with data.  
 The approach is an appealing alternative to the current measures of misreporting, such as 
                                                 
1 Chen (2016) documents scandals of fund misappropriation, abuse of power and lack of transparency in the non-
profit sectors. Norton (2014) suggests that the financial figures of the 50 largest UK charities by income could be 
more than double the self-reported accounts. Keating et al. (2008) find 74% of the regulatory filings from 
American non-profits fail to properly report categorical expenses. 
2 There has been a revised interest in Benford’s Law, see Amiram et al (2015) and Villas-Boas et al. (2017). 
3 One order of magnitude means one value is about ten times different in quantity than the other. 
4 A related distribution but better known in economics is Zipf’s law, explained in Gabaix (1999). Both laws are 
the special cases of Planck’s (1901) distribution (see Kafri and Kafri, 2013). 
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spending on charitable activities and/or overhead costs, for several reasons. First, it is highly 
replicable, and simple to calculate. Second, the required financial data are already in the public 
domain. Third, unlike previous studies using the distributional properties of financial figures 
in the non-profit literature, we can construct a misinformation measure for each charity, 
allowing a between-organisation analysis. Finally, it is acknowledged that people are rarely 
capable of manipulating datasets that follow either Benford’s Law or a random distribution 
(see Schulter et al., 2010; Boland and Hutchinson, 2000). Like other measures in “forensic 
economics” (Zitzewitz, 2012), the approach is not fail-proof, nor will it substitute for full 
auditing. Nevertheless, we believe it can serve as a useful and relatively low-cost first step for 
effective and more targeted audits. 
We then examine the link between the two popular performance metrics used in the 
charity sector and the organisational accountability literature which remain understudied by 
academics and poorly understood by policymakers (Aldashev et. al, 2015). Hampered by a lack 
of systematic organisational data and the complexity of annual reports (Dechow et al., 2010), 
policymakers and donors interested in accountability have to date had to rely on statistics such 
as programme ratios (the proportion of the total income spent on charitable activities) and 
overhead costs (the proportion of the total income spent on administrative activities). Garven 
et al.’s (2016) review of recent surveys of American private donors and charity watchdogs 
finds that programme ratios are a significant factor in both the donation decisions of donors, 
and regulatory policies of charity rating agencies and other non-profit governing boards. The 
consensus among individuals and donors surveyed is that  approximately 75% of the total 
budget should be spent on charitable activities; while the American Institute of Philanthropy 
suggests a “reasonable” ratio of 60% or higher. Aebischer (2012) reports the maximum 
overhead costs supported by European institutional donors ranges from 10  to 20%; while 
Charity Navigator, an American charity evaluator, purports 25% of the budget spent to be spent 
on overheads as a strong performance indicator (cited in Exley, 2019). Using experiments, 
Exley (2019) and Gneezy et al. (2014) respectively show that high programme ratios and low 
overhead costs facilitate donations and are used as an excuse for donation refusal. Yet, despite 
the popularity of these metrics there has been little evidence or assessments  of their usefulness 
(Exley, 2019; Garven et al., 2016). 
In this paper, we cast doubt on the belief that increased programme ratios and 
governance-related overhead costs alone would necessarily improve accountability. Keeping 
accurate records is costly and requires financial and human resources that could otherwise be 
spent on charitable activities. The opening quote by Singh (2015) asserts this strongly held 
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view from within the sector: while transparency is desired, spending on charitable services 
needs to remain the priority. Nor is there conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of increased 
accountability, even in the corporate literature (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). Without 
demonstrated value, increased spending on governance could incur unnecessary costs and 
distort charitable agendas (Aldashev et al., 2015). We build a simple a theoretical model which 
shows that, alone, neither higher charitable effort, nor stricter governance necessarily induces 
less bias in financial reporting. Instead, the agent (charity) could strategically misreport due to 
the trade-off between charitable effort and accuracy in reporting. 
We test the predictions by examining how the level of misreporting, measured by our 
Benford digital analysis, is affected by (i) the proportion of income spent on charitable 
activities (or programme ratio), a proxy for the charitable effort, and (ii) the proportion of 
income spent on governance activities (or governance-related overhead costs), a proxy for the 
oversight mechanism. To address the concerns of potential mismeasurement errors and 
confounders that affect both the tendency to exert effort and misreport, we extend the linear 
regressions by employing two instrumental variables strategies. The first uses two instruments 
that are easily observed or easy to cross-check by interested parties, namely, the number of 
official staff and spending on social security. The second strategy utilizes a novel estimator by 
Lewbel (2012) that uses conditional second moments to construct in-data instruments that do 
not require the standard exclusion restriction. Results from linear regressions controlling for 
various characteristics and the two IV estimations, with a battery of robustness checks, provide 
a consistent pattern supporting an interaction effect. We find, first, NPOs with higher charitable 
spending report more accurately only when governance spending exceeds a certain level (15% 
of total income in our preferred specification). To put the number in perspective, only 7% of 
the charities in our sample spend this figure of 15% highlighting the lack of resources available 
for these tasks. Woodwell and Bartczak’s (2008) survey for the US sector documents that 80% 
of US donors did not include sufficient overhead expenses related to reporting requirements. 
Second, NPOs with larger spending on accounting and auditing services publish financial 
records more accurately only if their charitable spending exceeds 70% of total income. 
Inaccuracy appears to be higher when the costs of maintaing accurate financial numbers are 
higher (for example, in larger and older charities), and lower when the probability of being 
detected as a data manipulator is high (such as the financial reports being audited or receiving 
government grants) or when the charities report more non-zero values. Taken together, we 
provide evidence against the naive use of programme ratios and overhead costs as indicators 
for non-profit transparency and accountability. Instead, we call for donors to provide a more 
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balanced expectation of the use of income when funding charitable activities and governance 
tasks if the aim is to improve the sector’s effectiveness and accountability. 
Our paper contributes to and bridges several fields of literature. First, it relates to 
“forensic economic” studies (Zitzewitz, 2012) on the prevalence and determinants of 
misreporting. Our application of Benford’s Law is closely tied to studies using distributional 
properties of numbers to detect irregularities (Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Michalski and Stolz, 
2013; Fang and Gong, 2017). In the non-profit literature, ours is the first systematic paper to 
consider the manipulation of publicly available financial data of nonprofits (see Hofmann and 
McSwain, 2013 for a review). We advocate the use of Benford's Law as an effective, 
investigative tool in the non-profit literature to flag potential charities for early investigation, 
particularly in a context where data is scarce. Second, we complement the for-profit literature 
on the determinants of information manipulation (see Bayer et al., 2010 for a review). Most of 
the literature suggests that firms may manipulate financial reports to depict a positive financial 
position in the investment market. Our paper points to two other reasons for misreporting: 
namely, the trade-off between charitable spending and accounting services and the lack of a 
strict oversight mechanism. Third, our theoretical framework provides an alternative 
explanation of firms and charities misbehaviour. Our model relates to Goldman and Slezak's 
(2006), Burns and Kedia's (2006), Beyer et al.'s (2014), Thakor's (2015) on designing optimal 
contracts under potential strategic information disclosure of firms, and Aldeshev et al. (2018) 
on the misbehaviours of international NGOs. Relatedly, we contribute to the growing literature 
on the theory of NGO regulation and monitoring (Auriol and Brilon, 2018; Aldashev and 
Navarra, 2018). Deviating slightly, our focus is on the charitable spending and the oversight 
mechanism as the key explanations for charities' misreporting behaviour. Our theoretical and 
empirical results complement previous theoretical predictions that there exists a point beyond 
which additional corporate governance decreases firm value (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). 
Finally, we contribute to the growing economics and accounting literature on the usefulness 
and limitations of performance metrics in evaluating charity effectiveness and transparency 
(Exley, 2019 Garven et al., 2016). We suggest that higher programme ratios and governance-
related overhead costs might fail to improve accountability and accuracy of financial reports. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains Benford’s Law, the UK Third Sector 
data and how our proxies are constructed. We discuss several caveats and how to remedy them 
in Section 2.3. We present the theoretical model in Section 3. Section 4 describes our empirical 
analysis. Section 5 reports the main findings. Section 6 summarises various robustness checks. 
Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Benford’s Law and the UK Third Sector Research Data 
2.1 Forensic Economics Studies and Benford’s Law 
There are several approaches to measuring misreporting in financial data. One popular method 
is through estimating accounting models and comparing the reported and predicted activities 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Another approach uses distributional properties of financial numbers 
such as discontinuity at zero of earnings or rates of returns to identify potential errors 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Lee and Lemieux, 2010).5 These measures have inherent 
drawbacks, such as, correlations with the underlying characteristics of the organisation and/or 
manager (see Amiram et al., 2015), or the confounding effects of scaling, sample selection and 
research designs (see Durtschi et al., 2005; Gilliam et al., 2015 for the discontinuity approach). 
They are also only feasible when detailed records or forward-looking information such as 
expected incomes or cashflows are available. Due to issues of data availability, non-profit 
studies are often constrained to evaluating categories of financial records, such as, fundraising 
expenses or returns on external investments, instead of more useful disaggregated data. A 
notable example includes Almond and Xia’s (2017) study which shows that some US non-
profits manipulate investment returns around zero to avoid revealing negative outcomes. Other 
studies look at misreporting in programme ratios (Trussel, 2003), the levels of social benefits 
(Vansant, 2016), cost-shifting (Krishnan and Yetman, 2011), or fundraising and administrative 
expenses (Yetman and Yetman, 2012). 
We improve on the previous literature with a digital analysis based on Benford’s Law for 
each organisation. Benford’s Law, also called the first-digit law, is a mathematical law 
regarding the frequency distribution of the leading digits in many sets of numerical data (e.g., 
the leading digit of the number 1201.17 is 1). Contrary to basic intuition, the occurrence of 
each digit as a leading digit in a set of numbers is usually not equal. Instead, the first digits of 
all numbers in a naturally occurred dataset are expected to occur with a logarithmically 
decreasing frequency. Physicist Benford in 1938 discovered this pattern and published a series 
of datasets that adhere to the decreasing distribution. Economist Hal Varian in his 1972 letter 
to the American Statistics Association promotes the use of Benford’s Law in detecting elicit 
behaviours in economic and financial data. The idea is formalised in Hill’s (1999) theorem: 
                                                 
5 For example, Bhattacharya and Tinkelman (2009) examine GuideStar data of 111,000 non-profits by 
distributional analysis and find no evidence of expense allocation manipulation. Similarly, Ballantine et al. (2007) 
find a highly significant discontinuity in residual incomes of English NHS hospitals during 1998-2004.   
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For samples randomly taken from a set of numbers following random distributions, the 
distribution of the first digits of all numbers from these samples will converge toward a 
distribution called the Benford distribution.  
The mathematical intuition behind why accurate empirical data would follow Benford’s 
Law is based on three facts. First, the first digit of any number N can be determined by taking 
its base 10 logarithm and obtaining the fraction behind the integer. For example, if the fraction 
after the integer of a number N is between 0 and 0.301 (an interval of 0.301), the first digit of 
N is 1. If the fraction after taking the natural logarithm is between 0.301 and 0.477, the first 




)) are equivalent to the probabilities that digits appear as the leading 
number (or digit 1 has a 30.1% of chance of being the leading number). Second, if the 
probability distribution function of the logarithm of N is smooth and symmetric, a number will 
be in the interval between n and n + 0.301, where n is an integer in the logarithmic distribution, 
with a probability of 30.1%, between n + 0.301 and n + 0.477 with 17.6% chance. The 
implication is that for numbers without human manipulation, there is a 30.1% (17.6%) of 
chance that their first digits would be 1 (2, respectively). Third, according to the Central Limit 
Theorem, distributions drawn from a random mixture of different distributions would be 
smooth and symmetric. The implication of this is that sets of data that comprise of different 
sources of numbers would have a smooth and symmetric probability distribution function such 
that the first digits of all the numbers should follow the Benford distribution. Hill’s (1999) 
theorem provides the following formal derivation:  




where 𝑃(𝑑) is the probability that digit 𝑑 = 1, 2, … , 9 occurs as the leading digit. Table 
1 records the theoretical distribution specified by Benford’s Law: 1 will appear as the leading 
digit 30.1% of the time, 2 will appear 17.6% of the time, and so forth. 
Table 1. Probability predicted by Benford’s Law for the leading digits 
𝑑 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 






The conditions laid out in Hill’s (1995) theorem are likely to apply to accurately reported 
financial data for two reasons.6 First, the correct (unobservable) realisations of financial items 
in the financial reports, such as total revenues, revenues from different sources or cash flows, 
are determined by many interactions by many individuals during a given period. These 
interactions could be considered as randomly distributed since they are known only to those 
involved. The financial items representing these interactions, therefore, are likely to be 
governed by different mechanisms. For example, the distribution of revenues from government 
funding plausibly differs from that of administrative costs. The mixture of these estimates, 
which constitute an organisation’s financial report, would follow Hill’s Theorem. Specifically, 
the aggregated set of numeric items representing revenue sources from grants, businesses or 
investments, together with expenditure figures on salaries, charitable activities, taxation, is 
expected to follow Benford’s Law.  
Following Nigrini’s (1996) seminal paper, the idea of using Benford’s Law to detect 
manipulations in financial data is now frequently mentioned in auditing and accounting 
papers.7 Nigrini (2012) documents successful applications of the method, including his 
detection of fraudulent financial reports of seven companies in New York City (commissioned 
by authorities of the City of New York). Durtschi et al. (2004), (Nye and Moul, 2007), 
Michalski and Stoltz (2013), Miller (2015), and Amiram et al. (2015) discuss how auditors can 
effectively use Benford's Law in detecting errors and frauds in annual reports and 
macroeconomic data. The main consensus is that accounting-related data are expected to 
adhere to the Benford distribution and as the deviation from the Benford distribution increases, 
the degree of errors increases. Amiram et al. (2015) provide the first simulation analysis using 
stylised financial statements to ascertain this property of Benford’s law. They show that only 
after introducing non-zero mean errors to the dataset do they see deviations from the Benford 
distribution; and the larger the error introduced, the larger is the deviation from the law. This 
property is akin to the idea of “hard-to-forge” signatures (Kossovosky, 2015 p.109). We exploit 
this characteristic to construct our measures for each charity below. 
 
 
                                                 
6 See Villas-Boas et al. (2017) recent statistical evidence of the law’s applicability to economic behavioural data. 
7 Following Zitzewitz’s (2012) taxonomy, measures based on Benford’s Law can be categorised as a statistical 
model-based approach. The primary assumption is similar to ours: fraudulent cases exhibit patterns that are very 




We use the Third Sector Research data deposited in the UK Data Services by Alcock and 
Mohan (2015) as the representative dataset for the British charity sector.8 The data are collected 
in five phases (first by the Third Sector Research Centre 07-08; and then by the UK Civil 
Society’s Almanac in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) and include yearly financial statements of 
16,391 charities for the period 2007-2015 (up to eight annual reports for each NPO).9 For each 
phase, financial characteristics were extracted from information on all registered charities in 
each year held by the Charity Commission for England and Wales, the Offices of the Scottish 
Charity Regulator, and the Financial Conduct Authority. Apart from standard items in a 
financial statement, the dataset provides detailed financial information on numerous types of 
expenses such as charitable and fundraising activities, voluntary incomes, administrative 
expenses, and employment statistics (see Appendix Table A1). The variety of financial items, 
drawn from different types of underlying distributions (such as revenues, donations, or 
expenses), increases the chance of conformity to Benford’s Law.10 All the figures are recorded 
rather than constructed from raw data. This feature preserves the “naturalness” of the 
underlying distributions as it avoids both seasonal adjustments, and the use of statistical 
methods used in constructing an index. 
For each charity, we use all the financial entries that appear on each annual report to 
calculate our measure of misreporting. In a standard financial statement, there are 135 entries 
(see Table A1). Ideally, we would use each annual report to construct organisation-year 
measures to study the dynamics of misreporting, however, many items are recorded as zero. 
Since there is no coding for missing observations, we treat these zeros as genuine information, 
that is, transactions whose values are zero. The zero items present a challenge to our analysis 
as the construction of the Benford measure requires at least 100 non-zero items in each tested 
unit to ensure the power of the related statistical tests.11 To achieve the statistical power, we 
                                                 
8 Due to survey design, only non-profits with the total income of at least £250,00 are collected. 
9 We first convert all financial items to Sterling using relevant exchange rates. There are charities whose 
headquarters are in Britain but operate abroad and choose to report in the local currencies (euros, Thai baht, 
Singaporean dollars, US dollars). The conversion does not alter the conformity of the dataset due to the scaling 
invariance property of the Benford distribution (see Morrow, 2014 or Michalski and Stoltz, 2013 for proof). 
10 We remove NPOs with negative assets or spending on governance or charitable activities.  
11 As the number of digits 𝑁 goes to infinity, the distribution converges to a chi-square distribution with 8 degrees 
of freedom. The chi-square statistics converges to the limit when 𝑁 ≥ 30 and 𝑃𝑒(𝑑𝑖) ≥ 5 for all 𝑑𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 9}. 
That is, the lower bound for 𝑁 to be a valid statistic is 𝑁 ≥ 5 𝑃𝑒(𝑑𝑖 = 9)⁄ > 100. Milchaski and Stoltz (2013) run 
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aggregate each NPO’s annual reports over the available years to calculate a measure of 
aggregated misreporting.  
The interpretation of our results is not affected by this practice. First, British charities 
provide their annual financial statements in blocks (in other words, several consecutive 
financial statements are collected at one point in time). Charities therefore can inject errors in 
multiple annual accounts in one submission so that it is appropriate to consider these multiple 
annual accounts as an aggregated dataset. Second, the practice of aggregating yearly data is not 
uncommon (see Amiram et al., 2015 for aggregated simulated accounting data; and Michalski 
and Stoltz (2013) for aggregated macroeconomic data).12 Kossovsky (2015, p.90) provides 
examples of aggregated data over months/years and an industry (combining multiple 
companies) that also conform with the law. Finally, the aggregated financial data satisfies the 
two statistical conditions for an accounting dataset to conform to Benford’s Law laid out in 
Durtschi et al. (2004), namely: (1) positive skewness and (2) mean-to-median ratio larger than 
one. Figure A1 in the Appendix demonstrates that our aggregated data for each charity satisfy 
the two conditions.  
In Section 6, we split the sample into two periods (pooling four years of data together) to 
show that our results are not sensitive to the aggregation even when we allow for the time 
dynamics of misreporting. Because splitting the data severely reduces our sample, for our main 
analysis, we consider a cross-sectional sample of 10,322 charities that provide at least 100 non-
zero financial figures over all their financial reports. 
Conceptually, removing NPOs with fewer than 100 non-zero financial items after pooling 
could lead to selection bias. For instance, some non-profits may choose to enter zero entries in 
each report strategically. We show that this bias does not drive our results. First, we replicate 
our main results when varying the threshold of at least 100 non-zero figures from 65 to 115. 
Second, zero transactions in an annual report could reflect an NPO’s choice either not to 
                                                 
simulations and suggest that tests for Benford’s Law is powerful only for samples with at least 110-digit points. 
We experiment with both the cut-offs and find similar results. 
12 Amiram et al. (2015) through simulated analysis and comparing with existing measures of reporting quality 
show that non-fabricated annual financial statements, whether in aggregate, by year, or by organisation-year are 
expected to conform to Benford’s Law. Nigrini (2011, chapter 17) uses multi-year financial statements to 
demonstrate the applicability of aggregate data in assessing errors and frauds by digital analysis. Michalski and 
Stoltz (2013), also citing the lack of detailed data, aggregate quarterly macroeconomic data from several countries 
according to their economic characteristics. Using random subsampling to draw Bernoulli random subsamples 
from the aggregated data subsets, they show that their whole dataset adheres to Benford’s Law. 
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participate in some activities or to withhold information. Non-participation is not a serious 
concern: it is plausibly independent of manipulative behaviour because the two mechanisms 
governing the decisions are different. We cannot address the information withholding concern 
with this dataset. We argue, however, that it is not critical to our analysis for three reasons. 
First, as the balance sheet in each financial year must remain in balance, withholding 
information by recording some transactions as zeros would require manipulating other non-
zero financial items.13 Our measures based on Benford’s Law would pick up this misreporting 
from the non-zero items. Second, we include in our empirical analysis a variable specifying the 
number of non-zero financial observations used in constructing the measures. The variable 
aims to account for both the diversity of the NPO’s activities and, potentially, the level of the 
NPO’s intention to disclose their financial details. Third, we report in Appendix 8.6.4 similar 
results when we use a Heckman correction model to account for the possibility that some NPOs 
report fewer non-zero transactions to withhold information.  
2.3. Measures of information misreporting 
There are two popular methods to measure inaccuracy using Benford’s Law: (1) using a 
measure of statistical dispersion (such as the Median Absolute Deviation), and (2) using test 
statistics and critical values to establish (reject) the conformity of the tested distribution (see 
Amiram et al., 2015). The main concern with using the second method is that test statistics are 
sensitive to the number of digits used. When the number of digits used increases, test statistics 
tend to over-reject the null hypothesis of the observed distribution adhering to the Benford 
distribution. It is because the critical values for these tests increase with the sample size (the 
number of digits used) that they require perfect conformity to establish (fail to reject) the null. 
The first method avoids this concern. The measure of statistical dispersion does not require a 
critical value, providing an objective comparison across organisations with different numbers 
of digits tested (Nigiri, 2012). For these reasons, we use the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) 
statistic in the main analysis.14 The MAD is calculated as the mean of the absolute difference 
between the empirical proportions of each digit in each NPO’s pooled financial reports and 
their respective theoretical proportion according to Benford’s Law (see Table 1): 
                                                 
13 There is no recorded information for balancing errors in the raw dataset.  
14 See Morrow (2014) and Miller (2015) for detailed discussion. Measures can be strongly influenced by the 
number of digits used, with some statistics requiring near-perfect conformity to the theoretical distribution as the 










where 𝑑𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 9 represents the digit; 𝑃𝑜(𝑑𝑖) is the observed proportion of digit 𝑑𝑖, 
𝑃𝑒(𝑑𝑖) is the expected proportion of digit 𝑑𝑖 according to Table 1.
15  To interpret, the larger the 
MAD statistic, the further the deviation from the theoretical distribution under the null 
hypothesis that the pooled report is free of errors and misrepresentation.  
In Section 6, we rerun the analysis with the three “critical value based” measures created 
from (1) the Pearson’s chi-square test statistics (𝜒2) of goodness of fit, (2) the Kolmogorov – 
Smirnov (KS) statistics and (3) a binary variable (Deviate) of whether we reject the null 
hypothesis of the data conforming to the Benford distribution using KS tests at the significance 
of 5% (1 = Yes, 0 = No). Despite the drawbacks discussed above, these measures have been 
widely used by previous studies and practitioners due to their ease of use and practical 
interpretations. Like the MAD statistic, higher values of the test statistics show the tested data 
diverge farther from the Benford distribution. The Pearson Chi-square statistic is the simplest 
measure to investigate whether distributions of two categorical datasets differ from each other 
(examples of the Chi-square test include Nye and Moul (2009), Michalski and Stoltz (2013)). 
The KS statistic quantifies the cumulative distance between the observed distribution of the 
tested organisation and the reference distribution (here, the Benford distribution) (examples of 
the KS test include Morrow (2014), Amiram et al. (2015)). For our analysis, we calculate the 
KS statistic as the maximum deviation from the Benford distribution. Finally, we use the binary 
variable Deviate for descriptive purposes to examine the number of organisations that provide 



























                                                 
15 Nigrini (2012) recommends a table of “critical values for rejecting conformity” for practitioners. However, it is 
based on simulated datasets of specific dataset types.  
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where 𝑁 is the total number of non-zero financial items used, 𝐷𝑁(𝛼) is the critical value 






) is the Benford 
specific critical value at 𝛼 calculated in Morrow (2014). Normally, for a significance level at 
𝛼 = 0.05, 𝑐(0.05) = 1.48. For the Deviate variable, we calculate the exact p-values for K-S 
tests P-values by sampling from the null distribution (Monte Carlo simulation) at 10,000 
replications (see Senchaudhuri et al., 1995 and Barasebi et al., 2017). 
Caveats of our measures: These measures hinge on the premise that an accurate 
financial statement adheres to Benford’s Law; while manipulated and erroneous data deviate 
from the law. Several factors may complicate our analysis. First, since an NPO may not cheat 
all the time (serial cheaters might be found out more quickly), the measures based on pooled 
data cannot pinpoint for which year or which financial items the illicit behaviour have occurred. 
Second, the measures cannot detect subtle types of cheating: such as rounding up numbers or 
petty manipulations which only affect the last digits (for example recording £1500 instead of 
£1268). These types of manipulation are difficult to deal with and require much richer data (see 
Schennach, 2013 for recent research). Third, one organisation could change all financial items 
by a common factor or in a creative way that preserves the Benford first digit distribution. Since 
changing one first digit of entry would later require altering other entries’ first digits, we expect 
that this manipulation is costly to implement. The experimental literature also shows that 
people tend to badly replicate known data-generating processes even when instructed to do so 
(Camerer, 2003, pp. 134 – 138). As Benford’s Law is widely used in the professional services 
but not publicly well-known (Cho and Gaines, 2007), it is unlikely that organisations would be 
able to preserve the Benford distribution. Bearing this in mind, we theoretically address the 
cost, if any, of preserving the distribution by introducing the governance cost that captures the 
effort of the agent to manipulate the report creatively. Empirically, we argue that it is not critical 
because measurement errors in the dependent variable (here the misreporting measure) do not 
lead to biased estimates. The only consequence is less precision in the estimated coefficients 
and lower t-statistics (Hausman, 2001).  
Finally, deviations from the Benford distribution could be due to poor data 
collection/bookkeeping (human errors) without an intention to mislead regulatory bodies. 
Although we cannot rule out the possibility of errors, we doubt that human errors could drive 
the deviations. First, rounding the first digit is rare (except for cases such as rounding £1998 to 
£2000). Second, if the rejection of the Benford distribution were caused by poor bookkeeping 
and data maintenance, these would be NPOs with the lowest spending on governance activities. 
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The data do not support this implication: considering NPOs with the lowest 10% of spending 
on governance activities, for 35% of these NPOs we fail to reject that their financial reports do 
not adhere to the Benford distribution according to the KS tests at the 5% level of significance. 
In Appendix 8.6, we test this implication by excluding NPOs in the bottom 10%, 25%, and 
50% of spending on governance. Another implication is that poor bookkeeping could lead to 
fewer data points being collected, so that including these NPOs would bias our results. We test 
this implication in Appendix 8.6 by alternating the threshold of the number of non-zero 
financial items used in our analysis from 65 to 115. 
2.4. An illustration of Benford’s Law 
Figure 1 shows graphical evidence to support the applicability of Benford's Law to our data. 
When combining available financial figures from all the surveyed charities, the distribution of 
the first digits of these figures closely follows the Benford distribution.16 When each charity is 
considered, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the observed distribution of the first digits 
of all the numbers follows the theoretical distribution for 75% of the sample using the 
Kolmogorov – Smirnov test at the significance level of 5%. Panel B provides a representative 
distribution of this group. We consider these NPOs as “conforming” to the law, namely, we fail 
to find evidence, both statistically and graphically, of potential misreporting. In contrast, we 
reject the null hypothesis for 25% of the sample. We call these charities as “deviating” from 
the law, suggesting that their full financial accounts contain inaccuracies detectable by 
Benford’s Law which indicates potential misreporting. Panel C provides an example of a 
charity charged by the Charity Commission of England and Wales in late 2016 for tinkering 
with data. For anonymity, we remove the charity’s name. Panel C shows a clear graphical 






                                                 
16 The conformity of the data does not prevent the possibility that some individual charities may have inaccurate 
financial data. It is because the overall conformity may come from a mixture of independent errors embedded in 
different charities’ data (different manipulators might manipulate different items in different ways). According to 
Hill's (1995) theorem, these independent errors would result in a mixture of independent distributions whose 
mixed distribution would follow Benford's Law. 
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Figure 1. The UK Third Sector Research Data and the Benford distribution 
 
Note: Lines represent the theoretical distribution in Table 1. Bars represent the observed distributions 
in three samples. Capped spikes represent confidence intervals at the 95% significance level. In Panel 
A, we aggregate all the numbers in all financial accounts in all years provided by all the NPOs. Panel 
B is for a representative NPO which we fail to reject the hypothesis test of conformity to the law using 
the Kolmogorov – Smirnov test (75% of the sample). Panel C is for a representative NPO whose 
requested financial accounts fail the hypothesis for its requested financial accounts (25% of the sample). 
For a representative purpose, we use one of the charities charged by the Charity Commission of England 
and Wales in late 2016. P-values used in the hypothesis testing are the exact p-values approximated by 













3. A theoretical model of optimal misreporting 
Consider a three-period reporting game between a donor (principal) and an NPO (agent) over 
a funded project. Our setup follows Goldman and Slezak’s (2006) where the agent may take a 
hidden action, which affects the (actual) terminal value of the project and misreport the 
intermediate value (such as financial records of the organisation) to an uninformed donor to 
gain a higher payoff. In our context, the payoff can be either periodic grant disbursements 
subject to satisfactory performance of the agent or future grants that use the report as part of 
the grant application. As such, the agent has an incentive to inflate the unrealised value in their 
report to the donor.17 The optimal contract is to incentivise the agent to work on the project’s 
actual value and to minimise the agent’s incentive to misreport the value. Different from their 
model, we distinguish two types of reporting errors: intentional manipulation and unintentional 
errors, such as failing to comprehend and estimate the current state of the organisation or simply 
human errors when recording information. For simplicity, we assume the human errors 
(genuine mistakes) in the bookkeeping process are specific to organisations and unknown to 
the agent when reporting their value.18 We discuss key features of our model below.  
3.1 Basic building blocks  
At 𝑡 = 0, a risk-neutral donor contracts with an NPO to deliver a social project that yields a 
terminal value in the long run 𝑡 = 2. The NPO is assumed to be risk-averse since they are not 
allowed to distribute their profit (see Wedig, 1994). During 𝑡 = 0, the NPO privately makes 
two one-time decisions. First, the amount of unobservable action 𝑎 ≥ 0 (such as the level of 
dedication or effort). Second, the extent of misreporting (denoted 𝑏) of the report that the NPO 
will issue at 𝑡 = 1 (such as how much the report will inflate the privately observed intermediate 
state of the project). Exerting effort and misreporting are both costly to the NPO. Let the NPO’s 
disutility of exerting action 𝑎 be  𝜓𝑎(𝑎) =
𝛿
2
𝑎2, where the convex functionality represents the 
increasing marginal disutility at rate 𝛿 > 0. Let 𝜓𝑏(𝑏) =
𝑔
2
𝑏2 represent the NPO’s cost of 
                                                 
17 This assumption is consistent with manipulation incidents documented in Krishnan and Yetman (2011) that 
Californian non-profit hospitals may misreport program ratios to the state regulatory agency by +8%. 
18 Human errors consist of unintentional coding errors or mistakes when inputting the numbers. Since our 
measures of misreporting rely on the very first digit of the numbers, it is unlikely that human errors would affect 
our measures of misreporting. Coding errors or rounding off numbers are more likely to affect the last few digits 
than the first digit. For completeness, however, we provide in the Online Appendix an extension of the model 
when we allow the level of governance spending to affect the organisation-specific human errors.  
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producing a report with an amount (𝑏) of misreporting, where the governance spending 𝑔 > 0 
is the spending on governance/auditing activities by the agent. The cost of misreporting 𝜓𝑏(𝑏) 
reflects the disutility of misreporting and has two components. First, a higher level of 
misreporting 𝑏 leads to an increasingly higher level of disutility due to two factors: (i) the time 
spent lobbying the auditor or coming up with creative ways to get around monitoring 
requirements and (ii) the intrinsic aversion to lying (Hurkens & Kartik, 2009; Gneezy, 2005). 
Second, a higher level of governance spending 𝑔 represents a higher governance quality in the 
organisation, leading to a higher disutility caused by the act of getting around the governance 
hurdles to manipulate the report. By governance quality, we follow Beyer et al.'s (2014) and 
Thakor's (2015) interpretation in which the oversight mechanism is fixed and required by the 
donor for pressurising the agent to conform to being accountable and aligning their interests 
more closely. For example, donors condition funding on the composition of the oversight 
board/committee; or the NPO’s accounting division and choice of external auditors. In practical 
terms, governance spending involves governance-related administrative expenses, auditing and 
accounting fees that are directly observable in our data.  
Finally, we assume the NPO incurs a reputation loss 𝜓𝑐(𝑏) = 𝑐(𝑏 − 𝑏𝑒) for deviating 
from the donor’s prior belief of the NPO’s equilibrium misreporting 𝑏𝑒 ≥ 0. The linear 
functionality is for tractability and captures two notions. First, the reputation loss 𝜓𝑐(𝑏) 
increases with misreporting, regardless of the prior belief 𝑏𝑒 ≥ 0. Since the NPO only suffers 
any reputation concern if the principal finds out, parameter 𝑐 also captures the probability that 
the principal detects the deviation. The higher the probability of being found out, the higher the 
reputation loss (gain) is when the NPO deviates from (conforms with) the donor’s prior belief. 
Taking this probability into consideration, if the NPO’s misreporting choice is better than 
expected, that is the NPO misreports less than what the donor expects 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑒, the NPO’s 
reputation gains 𝜓𝑐(𝑏) > 0. Otherwise, the NPO’s reputation reduces by 𝜓𝑐(𝑏) < 0. Second, 
the linearity and parameter 𝑐 reflect how deviating from some prior belief of reputation matters 
to the NPO for future fundraising activities. Empirically, we can think of 𝑐 as capturing the 
degree of repetitive interactions between the donor and the agent, for example, whether the 
report is subject to external auditing or how the NPO’s income relies on resources from 
fundraising or grant applications. Intuitively, NPOs without large internal funds (such as 
endowments or inherited grants) would have to rely on external support and would have the 
incentive to maintain a strong impression with the donor, thereby minimising the level of 




At 𝑡 = 0, the agent chooses action 𝑎 that yields a gross terminal value at 𝑡 = 2, denoted as 𝑉 =
𝜌𝑎 + 𝜂 + . Parameter 𝜌 > 0 is a productivity factor, 𝜂 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂
2) reflects random 
organisation-specific uncertainty, and ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2) represents random idiosyncratic shocks 
faced by the NPO after the initial period. As discussed above, the organisation-specific 
uncertainty 𝜂 captures two features. First, there are organisation shocks to the NPO such as 
termination of funding towards its main services. Second, it captures human errors generated 
during the bookkeeping process. These errors are assumed random and unknown to the NPO 
when deciding the optimal action 𝑎. Regarding the information set, we assume 𝜂 and  are 
unknown to the NPO when choosing the level of action 𝑎 at 𝑡 = 0; while 𝜌, 𝜎𝜂
2 and 𝜎2 and the 
parameters of the cost functions are commonly known. 
Since the true intermediate value is unobserved by the donor, the NPO could misreport 
by an amount of errors 𝑏 and issues the report 𝜃 = 𝜃𝑇 + 𝑏. Assume for convenience that 𝑏 ≥
0 or the NPO tends to over-report the project’s value to mislead the donor for a higher payoff. 
Based on the observed report, 𝜃, the donor forms their expected terminal value, 𝑆, and disburses 
the contracted grant 𝑊 specified below.  
At 𝑡 = 2, the actual gross terminal value 𝑉 induced by action 𝑎 and the amount of 
inaccuracy 𝑏 are recognised. Recall that at 𝑡 = 0, by choosing the misreporting amount 𝑏, the 
NPO diverts some of the project’s resources away from productive uses to prepare for the 
misstated report at 𝑡 = 1 (for example, the monetary cost for bribing or colluding with auditors, 
or the opportunity cost of the NPO’s time spent on manipulating the accounts). For simplicity, 
we assume this diverted resource linearly reduces the project’s terminal value. Namely, for an 
amount of errors 𝑏, the gross terminal value at 𝑡 = 2 falls by 𝜆𝑏, where the commonly known 
𝜆 > 0 parameterises the incremental cost of the resources diverted. The net terminal value 
induced by action 𝑎 and manipulation 𝑏 is given by:  
𝑉2 = 𝑉 − 𝜆𝑏 = 𝜌𝑎 + 𝜂 + − 𝜆𝑏 = 𝜃
𝑇 − 𝜆𝑏 + (6) 
Figure 2 summarises the model’s timeline. 




3.3. Payoffs  
The first-best solution occurs when the donor could contract on the project’s terminal value so 
that there is no misreporting. Given the value often takes time to recognise, it is unrealistic to 
wait until the terminal value is observed before the NPO is compensated.  
Instead, we focus on the second-best solution in which there exists hidden action and 
information. The donor needs an indication of the project’s terminal value to pay the NPO 
according to their performance at 𝑡 = 1. The expected value 𝑆 = 𝐸(𝑉|𝜃), based on the agent’s 
report 𝜃, is the only observable performance measure the donor can use. As standard, we 
assume that at 𝑡 = 0 the donor designs a linear contract 𝑊(𝑆) as: 
𝑊(𝑆) = 𝑤𝑜 + 𝑤1𝑆 (7) 
where 𝑤𝑜 is the upfront payment and  𝑤1 is the value-sensitivity of the contract.
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The donor knows of potential misreporting in the report 𝜃 and forms their belief of the 
net terminal value 𝑉2 by subtracting the received report 𝜃 by an amount 𝑏
𝑒: 𝑉2 = 𝜃 − 𝑏
𝑒. 
Similar to (Stein, 1989) and Golman and Slezak (2006), we assume that this prior belief 𝑏𝑒 is 
formed before the contract begins, remains exogenously fixed due to the one-off nature of the 
interaction, and is not updated after observing the report 𝜃.20 This belief could be formed by 
examining previous records of the NPO and their organisational structure. When this belief is 
rational, that is the donor perfectly predicts the equilibrium level of misreporting resulting from 
the optimal contract 𝑏𝑒 = 𝑏∗, information misreporting has no impact on the expectation of the 
gross terminal value. 21  Otherwise, the expected value 𝑆 is increasing in the actual amount of 
misreporting 𝑏 and decreasing in the expected intensity of the NPO’s misreporting 𝑏𝑒. 
Formally, the expectation of the net terminal value given the report 𝜃 at 𝑡 = 1 is:  
𝑆 = 𝐸[𝑉2|𝜃] = 𝐸[𝜃
𝑇 + |𝜃] = 𝜃 − 𝑏𝑒 − 𝜆𝑏𝑒 = 𝜌𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝑏 − 𝑏𝑒 − 𝜆𝑏𝑒 (8) 
At 𝑡 = 1, the NPO undertakes the contract, receives 𝑊(𝑆), incurs the disutility of effort, 
                                                 
19 The term “value-sensitivity” means the grant paid to the agent is linearly correlated with the reported mid-term 
value. For example, if the agent reports they have reached out 1,000 additional beneficiaries, the donor will pay 
accordingly £10,000 more. Here, 𝑤1 = 10. 
20 Another extension to assume that the donor can be naïve and expect that 𝑏𝑒 = 𝜏𝑏∗  with probability of 𝜏; while 
the donor can be sophisticated and perfectly expect that 𝑏𝑒 = 𝑏∗ with probability of (1 − 𝜏). The empirical 
predictions of interest remain.   
21 One complex extension is to assume a Bayesian game with updating beliefs and punishment in dynamic 
interactions. We chose not to model such a game for parsimony. One example is Benabou & Laroque's (1992) 
study on information manipulation in financial market. 
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𝑏2 and 𝜓𝑐(𝑏) = 𝑐(𝑏 − 𝑏𝑒), 
respectively. The induced wealth of the NPO is: 
𝜔 = 𝑊(𝑆) − 𝜓𝑎(𝑎) − 𝜓𝑏(𝑏) − 𝜓𝑐(𝑏) (9) 
As standard, we assume the NPO has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility 
function, 𝑢(𝜔) = −exp(−𝑟𝜔) with the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion coefficient of 𝑟 >
0. According to the zero-profit assumption, we normalise the reservation utility 𝑢0 to zero. 
With the payoffs specified, there are several standard results. 
Lemma 1. Given NPO’s information set 𝜔0
𝑁 at 𝑡 = 0, the NPO would require a certainty 
equivalent for undertaking contract 𝑊 whose induced wealth at 𝑡 = 1 is given by (9) as:  
𝐶𝐸(𝑊, 𝑎, 𝑏|𝜔0
𝑁) 
= 𝑤0 + 𝑤1(𝜌𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝑏 − 𝑏


















2 reflects the premium that the NPO needs to protect themselves against 
organisation-specific shocks 𝜂, which is not realised until 𝑡 = 1.  
At 𝑡 = 0, given the information set (𝑤0, 𝑤1, 𝜌, 𝑏
𝑒 , 𝜆, 𝛿, 𝑔, 𝑟, 𝜎𝜂
2), the NPO aims to 
maximise their utility by choosing action 𝑎 and the misreporting level 𝑏. As the expected utility 
is equivalent to the utility at certainty equivalent 𝐸[𝑢(𝜔)|𝜔0
𝑁] = 𝑢(𝐶𝐸) and the utility function 
is monotonic, the NPO’s problem is equivalent to maximising the certainty equivalent 
regarding 𝑎 and 𝑏: 
max
𝑎,𝑏
𝐶𝐸 = 𝑤0 + 𝑤1(𝜌𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝑏 − 𝑏












The first-order condition gives the NPO’s action and misreporting choice as: 





𝑏∗ = max {0,
𝑤1 − 𝑐
𝑔
+ 𝜏} (13) 
As standard, to induce the agent to exert any action, the principal must offer a contract 
positively sensitive to the performance measure 𝑆 (𝑤1 > 0); while the optimal action is 
decreasing with the marginal rate of disutility 𝛿. When the reputation concern dominates the 
marginal benefit from the performance-based sensitivity, the agent’s optimal strategy is to 
report truthfully. Namely, if the NPO wants to maintain a good record or future contract with 
the donor, they will report truthfully. If the incremental reputation concern 𝑐 is sufficiently 
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small, there exists a positive value of optimal inaccuracy. For the rest of the analysis, we 
examine this situation where 𝑤1 > 𝑐 − 𝜏𝑔.  
The donor considers the optimal levels of action and misreporting to design a contract 
𝑊(𝑆) that maximises the terminal value net of the grants by solving: 
max
𝑤0,𝑤1
{𝑉2 −𝑊(𝑆)}   (14) 
subject to the incentive compatibility {𝑎∗, 𝑏∗} = argmax
𝑎,𝑏
CE and the participation 
constraint: 
𝐶𝐸 = 𝑤0 + 𝑤1(𝜌𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝑏 − 𝑏











2 ≥ 𝑢0 = 0 (15) 
In equilibrium, the participation constraint holds at equality so that the NPO earns zero 
profit. 𝐶𝐸 = 0 implies that: 
𝑤0 = −[𝑤1(𝜌𝑎





































The first-order condition gives the unique equilibrium contract (𝑤0
∗ , 𝑤1
∗) as: 
Corollary 2. There exists unique (𝑤0
∗ , 𝑤1
∗) such that 𝑤1
∗ satisfies (17) and 𝑤0















i. The value-sensitivity 𝑤1
∗ decreases with the disutility of effort 𝛿, risk aversion 𝑟, and 
the agent’s specific uncertainty at the intermediate state 𝜎𝜂
2 
ii. The value-sensitivity increases with the agent’s productivity 𝜌 
iii. The lump-sum amount 𝑤0
∗ is set for the reservation utility equals to zero. 
We assume that governance spending 𝑔 is sufficiently high, 𝑔 > 𝛿𝜆 𝜌2⁄ , so that the 
performance-based sensitivity 𝑤1
∗ is always positive. As such, the equilibrium performance-
based sensitivity is a function of the diverted resource cost 𝜆, the governance spending 𝑔, the 
incremental compensation for productivity 𝜌, action cost 𝛿 and the organisation-specific risks 
borne by the NPO 𝑟𝜎𝜂
2. Equation (18) specifies the form for the contracted value sensitivity. 
Implications (i) and (ii) are standard: the donor will always set a positive performance-based 
sensitivity 𝑤1
∗ to incentivise productive effort. The sensitivity will be higher for a higher-
productivity agent while being lower for an agent with less incentive to work (higher disutility 
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of effort) or with a higher level of risk aversion or associated risk. Implication (iii) is equivalent 
to the zero-profit assumption of the NPO. 
Substituting 𝑤1









 + 𝜏 (19) 
where we define 𝛽 =
𝜌2
𝛿
 and Δ = 𝑟𝜎𝜂
2 for convenience.  
3.4. Comparative statics and testable predictions 
The following propositions specify comparative statics that characterises the equilibrium 
interactions between the optimal amount of action and misreporting regarding observable 
characteristics. We restrict the results to those needed for the empirical analysis.  
Proposition 1: When the productivity (𝜌) of the NPO is sufficiently high or the disutility (𝛿) 
is relatively small for the donor to offer a positive performance-based sensitivity 𝑤1
∗ > 0, there 




𝜆 + 𝑐 + √(𝜆 + 𝑐)𝜆 +
𝛽(𝜆 + 𝑐)
𝛽 + Δ
𝛽 − 𝑐(𝛽 + Δ)





 and Δ = 𝑟𝜎𝜂
2 and: 





> 0 if and only if  𝑔 < ?̃?  





< 0 if and only if  𝑔 > ?̃? 
Proof: See Appendix 8.2. Intuitively, the threshold effect follows the non-monotonicity of the 
optimal misreporting function because the governance spending term enters the optimal 
misreporting function non-monotonically.  
Proposition 1 suggests a high level of charitable effort needs not be a signal for the report 
being more accurate. Part (i) suggests that if an NPO’s governance spending falls below a 
certain threshold, an agent exerting a higher level of productive effort will report the 
intermediate state less accurately. If the governance spending exceeds the threshold, a highly 
productive agent will be more likely to issue an accurate report. There are two intuitive 
explanations for this proposition. First, a low level of governance spending will impose a looser 
accountability mechanism over the agent’s reporting procedure, allowing the highly productive 
agent to inflate their reported state to capture an even higher level of payoffs. In contrast, when 
the governance spending is sufficiently high, the stricter governance mechanism prevents 
manipulative behaviours of the highly productive agent. The reason is that misreporting 
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becomes too costly for the highly productive agent: under strict scrutiny, “good” organisations 
would issue accurate statements to avoid potential punishments associated with being detected 
as untruthful (Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Second, a sufficient level of spending on 
administrative and accounting activities may reduce human errors, particularly when the agent 
focuses on generating highly productive effort. Whereas when the level of productive effort is 
low, the agent will divert the resources to creative accounting and intentional misreporting, 
increasing the intensity of misreporting which is already prone to human errors.  
Proposition 2: When 𝑤1
∗ > 0, there exists a threshold of the optimal action ?̃? > 0 such that:  
i.           
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑔
> 0 if and only if  𝑎∗ < ?̃?  
ii.            
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑔
< 0 if and only if  𝑎∗ > ?̃? 
Proof: See Appendix 8.3. 
Proposition 2 suggests that higher spending on governance activities (a tighter oversight 
mechanism) does not guarantee reports being more credible. An agent with higher governance 
spending would still report the intermediate state less accurately if their optimal effort falls 
below a threshold ?̃? (a low type). In contrast, if the optimal effort is exceptionally high, an 
agent with a tighter oversight mechanism would report the state more closely to the true value. 
One way to intuitively explain Proposition 2 is to classify two types of agents: high (low) type 
NPOs are those who choose their optimal effort higher (lower) than the threshold (for example, 
an industry norm, or implicit agreement with donors). Low-type NPOs could divert the spare 
effort and resources to devising creative accounting to inflate the intermediate state. 
Meanwhile, high-type NPOs are now constrained by the limited resources, which have been 
spent on the project, and would choose to report accurately for two reasons. First, reporting 
accurately is now cheaper than devising creative techniques to overcome the tighter oversight 
mechanism. Second, high-type NPOs are more concerned with their reputation, especially 
when the tighter oversight mechanism could indicate a higher possibility of being found out or 
they place higher importance on being transparent. These explanations are consistent with 
Proposition 1.   
Using the first-order condition for Equation (19), we specify several testable comparative 
statics in Corollary 3.  
Corollary 3: When 𝑤1
∗ > 0, the following statics hold: 
i.             
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝜌
< 0 , 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝜆
< 0, and  
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑐
< 0  
ii.             
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝛿
> 0 and 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑟
< 0 , 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝜎𝜂
2 < 0 
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Part (i) suggests that NPOs with higher productivity, higher resources lost due to 
manipulation and higher reputation concerns will choose a lower level of misreporting. Part 
(ii) implies that the higher cost of exerting action is correlated with greater information 
misreporting; whereas higher risk aversion and higher organisation-specific risk variances 
induce a larger reporting accuracy. The intuition is that an NPO may opt to misrepresent 
financial information instead of spending higher costly effort to improve the terminal value. To 
see why the NPO would respond to a riskier environment (a higher 𝑟 and 𝜎𝜂
2) by reducing the 
extent of misreporting, notice from Equation (13) that all of the parameters in Corollary 3 have 
no direct effect on misreporting, rather the effect is through the incentive 𝑤1
∗ as in Corollary 2. 
As the risk aversion and risk variances increase, the value-based incentive 𝑤1
∗ is set lower to 
discourage the NPO from taking the risk. The NPO would now have less incentive to 
manipulate the report due to the lower value-based incentive. The intuition for Corollary 3 
stems from the contract structure that dictates the compensation to be paid before the verifiable 
terminal value is realised. The agent faces a trade-off between expending effort to improve the 
true state of the project and manipulate the report on which the contract is based.  
We provide a simple model to parameterise the level of misreporting an NPO would 
commit if it is able to report the state of a funded project before the terminal impact is realised. 
Under the assumption that the donor would form a belief about the NPO’s misreporting 
strategy, we show the level of optimal misreporting would depend on both the charitable effort 
and the oversight mechanism (cost of misreporting). We test the predictions below.  
4. The econometric methodology 
4.1. Empirical specifications 
Denote 𝑏𝑖 the optimal degree of inaccuracy chosen by NPO 𝑖. We are primarily concerned with 
the effects of the choice of action (denoted 𝑎𝑖) and governance spending (denoted 𝑔𝑖) on the 
misreporting level. We capture the threshold effect of 𝑔𝑖 on the effect 𝑎𝑖 on 𝑏𝑖 through an 
interaction term in the following specification: 
𝑏𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑎𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑎𝑖 × 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾4𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖 (21) 
where Ii = 𝑎𝑖 × 𝑔𝑖 is the interaction between the optimal action 𝑎𝑖 and the governance 
spending 𝑔𝑖; 𝛾𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3} are the parameters of interest; 𝑋𝑖 and 𝛾4 are respectively vectors of 
control variables and their parameters; 𝛾0 represents a constant and 𝑖 is the error term. 
The theory predicts that 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 should be positive; while 𝛾3 should be negative. These 
predictions are of a direct consequence of Proposition 1. Indeed, when 𝑔 is set at 𝑔 = 0 <  ?̃? =
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−𝛾3 𝛾1⁄ , Proposition 1 suggests that 𝛾1 = 𝜕𝑏
∗ 𝜕𝑎∗⁄ > 0. Likewise, when the NPO chooses 
zero effort, 𝑎∗ = 0 < ?̃? = 𝛾3 𝛾2⁄ , Proposition 2 suggests (Appendix 8.3) that 𝛾2 = 𝜕𝑏
∗ 𝜕𝑔⁄ >
0. If 𝑔 is sufficiently high such that:  𝜕𝑏∗ 𝜕𝑎∗⁄ = 𝛾1 + 𝛾3𝑔 < 0, we have 𝛾3 < −
𝛾1
𝑔
< 0.  
Main variables of interest: For the dependent variable, we use the MAD statistic to measure 
the intensity of misreporting 𝑏𝑖. For non-binary explanatory variables we take the averages of 
the respective financial figures over the years, to correspond to the  pooled annual financial 
statements constructed for the dependent variable. To proxy for each NPO’s choice of the 
optimal charitable action we use the ratio of spending on charitable activities to the NPO’s total 
income (Charitable Spending). Although the amount of income spent on charitable activities 
is not always a perfect signal to assess the charitable effort, it is highly correlated. Indeed, a 
non-profit with a higher ratio could be inferred to be exerting higher effort in maximising the 
use of their income. This has long been used as the standard measure for the effectiveness of a 
charity (namely, the programme ratio as reviewed in Hofmann and McSwain, 2013).  
For Governance Spending, 𝑔𝑖, we use the proportion of the total income spent on 
governance activities. This variable captures the governance-related overhead costs as 
modelled in Section 3. As reported in Table A1, there are two categories underneath the broad 
item Total Governance Costs: (i) Costs of accounting and audit fees, and (ii) Costs of 
administration. According to the reporting practice recommended by the Charity Commission 
(SOPR, 2005:p.31) these costs include: the cost of accounting activities and the fees of internal 
and external audits; legal advice for trustees; costs of holding statutory and board meetings; 
and governance-related administrative costs, such as, preparing statutory accounts, some 
employee costs where staff are providing administrative support to trustees, or costs of 
materials in supporting the governance activities. To capture the quality of the oversight and 
governance mechanism, we would ideally want to use the size of the governing board, or the 
professional certificates or years of experience held by the governing board. In the absence of 
such variables, we argue our aggregated spending variable acts as a good proxy for the quality 
of the oversight mechanism. As explained in the theoretical model, our aggregated variable 
reduces the level of mistakes in two ways: first, the higher the aggregated governance costs the 
higher the disutility of misreporting due to a higher probability of getting caught from the 
increased level of auditing and administration; second a higher governance spending would 
improve the book-keeping procedures that can ensure accurate records and reduce human 
errors. We experiment with using each component of the aggregated costs in Table OA1 
(Online Appendix) and obtain similar results. 
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The interaction term (Interaction Term), 𝐼𝑖, is generated by multiplying Charitable 
Spending and Governance Spending.  
Control variables: The set 𝑋𝑖 aims to control for other observable characteristics and potential 
determinants that affect the precision of our measure of misreporting. We include the log of 
total assets (NPO size) to control for size; and the number of years the NPO has operated up to 
the first survey (Age) to measure the NPO’s establishment or familiarity with the sectoral norm 
(a standard practice, see Yetman and Yetman, 2011). 
We also include the reported number of volunteers (Volunteers) to account for the fact 
that non-profit organisations are often overseen and run mainly by volunteers. In many cases, 
NPOs operate with modest internal accounting practices with volunteers serving as part-time 
bookkeepers (Keating and Frumkin, 2003). As the volunteers may receive little instruction or 
may simply not be fully committed, deficiencies in training and dedication can result in poor 
reporting accuracy. In contrast, having attracted a substantial base of volunteers could be a 
signal of the strength of the non-profit’s philanthropy arm and concern about their reputation. 
The consequence is the organisation becomes more open and transparent in their financial 
reports to maintain their position (see Corollary 3). The impact of volunteers depends on the 
balance between these two arguments. Although excluding this variable does not alter the core 
results, we discuss the importance of controlling for volunteers in our empirical strategy below. 
We include six additional binary variables (Yes = 1, No = 0) that capture whether the 
NPO has ever: (1) reported expenditure on either internal or external audits (Being audited), 
(2) received grants from any local, national or foreign government (Receive government 
grants), (3) reported zero fundraising expenses (Zero fundraising)22, (4) reported any losses 
from their investments/pension funds (Losses from investments), (5) received restricted income 
that is given for a specific purpose but within the charity’s overall objective (Receive restricted 
income), and (6) received endowment funds (Have endowment funds). Since we pool all of the 
available annual financial statements, the binary variables equal 1 if the corresponding 
variables take the value 1 at least once during the surveyed period, 0 otherwise. Previous non-
profit studies indicate that the variables are expected to be associated with misreporting. Not 
having reports audited is a popular potential determinant of accounting fraud; while 
dependence on some specific types of donations, particularly from governments, can lessen the 
non-profit’s incentive to undertake illicit activities (see Garven et al., 2016). It also seems 
                                                 
22 We also replace the dummy variable Zero fundraising with the actual spending on fundraising and publicity 
activities (average over the years) and re-do our analysis. The qualitative results (insignificant estimates) remain. 
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implausible that a non-profit could incur exactly zero expense in fundraising, hence reporting 
zero fundraising should infer some reporting inaccuracy. Incurring losses from investments or 
pension funds could induce the NPO’s manager to manipulate their reports to hide the loss. 
Receiving restricted income and endowment funds could reduce the NPO’s motivation for 
reporting manipulation: the charity upon receiving restricted income and endowment funds has 
ownership rights and will be acting as a principal instead of as an agent in the case of conduit 
giving. We expect that as these charities have more power over their restricted income and 
greater reputation concerns for future receipts, they have the incentive to behave diligently and 
report accurate statements. They are also more likely to operate more sophisticated accounting 
systems that may be less prone to inaccuracy.23  
To further test the impact of fundraising pressure and reputation concern outlined in 
Corollary 3 (part i), we include the variable Income from donations/grants, constructed as the 
ratio of the income from charitable activities and voluntary sources over total income, to 
capture the intensity of the reliance on these income sources.   
Finally, we include the number of non-zero financial entries (Number of non-zeros) and 
the number of annual reports (Number of yearly reports) to control for the size of the digit pool 
used to create the accuracy measures. Controlling for NPO’s size and the number of yearly 
reports, more non-zero financial items being reported could be an indication of the NPO’s 
openness and transparency. For that reason, we expect Number of non-zeros to be associated 
with a higher level of accuracy.24 For two NPOs with the same Number of non-zeros, the NPO 
with fewer yearly reports could either have fewer activities or a less complex operation or be 
strategically withholding information by recording more zeros in their annual report. We expect 
the Number of yearly reports to be associated with a higher level of inaccuracy.  
                                                 
23 A pitfall of using binary variables is the loss of information. However, reducing the continuous variables to 
binary variables suits our context of potential misreporting for two reasons. First, the magnitudes of the reported 
continuous values could be manipulated (such as underreporting losses or over-reporting gains). As the binary 
variables are for the cumulated period (ever reporting losses for instance), NPOs would be more likely to 
underreport losses rather than record zero losses over the long period. Binary variables could retain the information 
of, for example, whether the NPO experiences losses. Such measures are less prone to measurement error. Second, 
our results remain similar if we replace these last two binary variables by the ratios of restricted 
income/endowment funds to the total income (dependence on restricted income/ endowment funds) or exclude 
the variables from our specification.  
24 Our main results remain similar even when we exclude these two control variables. 
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4.2. Empirical strategy: traditional IV and Lewbel’s (2012) approach 
There are two concerns when estimating the effect of the charitable effort (measured by 
Charitable Spending) on the reporting behaviour of the NPO (measured by the MAD statistic). 
First, there could be variables that affect both illicit behaviours and the organisation’s tendency 
to exert effort. For example, a committed NPO would be likely to exert greater effort but be 
less likely to engage in manipulative activities. Second, the variable Charitable Spending could 
itself be mis-measured, with this measurement error increasing the MAD statistic. Since we 
expect a positive estimate of the effect (𝛾1), a negative correlation between the unobserved 
commitment and the tendency to report less accurately would result in a attenuation bias. Our 
estimates would become closer to zero than the unbiased parameters, but the signs should 
remain. We aim to address this omitted variable bias by: first, excluding NPOs with unrealistic 
financial items (such as negative total assets or expenses); and second, including various 
control variables to mitigate the omitted variable bias. We extend the linear regressions further 
by employing two IV strategies, namely, the traditional method and Lewbel’s 
heteroscedasticity IV esstimator.  
The traditional IV approach requires valid instruments that satisfy two criteria: being 
strongly correlated with Charitable Spending and the Interaction term (strong identification) 
and be orthogonal to the outcome variable after controlling for other potential confounders 
(exclusion restriction). Because endogeneity could also arise from measurement error in the 
outcome variable, the valid instruments also need to be free from possible misreporting. Based 
on the data available, we propose two instruments: the NPO’s number of official staff 
(Headcount of staff), and the actual spending on social security benefits (Social Security 
spending). These two instruments are less likely to be misreported by NPOs. The number of 
staffs is easily either observed or can be cross-checked through employment contracts by the 
authority or the interested donors. Likewise, because the amount of social security cost is 
recorded in official/government papers, the NPOs will be restrained from falsifying these 
figures. The instruments are also likely to satisfy the other two criteria. For strong 
identification, we expect the number of staff and the amount of income spent on social security 
to positively correlate with charitable spending as more activities or services would require 
more paid employees, at least in the roles of supervision or planning. To account for the 
possibility of weak instrumentation, we also use the limited information maximum likelihood 
(LIML) procedure (Murray, 2006). For the exclusion restriction, because only a few specific 
staff, such as the accounting division, would have been involved in misrepresenting financial 
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information, it is difficult to argue that the employment size and social security contribution 
could have any direct impact on the misreporting behaviour. To our knowledge, there exists 
virtually no evidence to indicate the direct influence of the employment size on reporting 
accuracy and the incidence of accounting errors.25 As we already control for the NPO size, 
spending on administrative/governance, auditing, and volunteering size, we expect that both 
the instruments can be excluded from the main Equation (21). Statistically, we report the 
Sargan-Hansen tests of over-identification to support the argument.  
Another concern is that the Interaction term could be endogenous due to the Charitable 
Spending component. The Hausman endogeneity test fails to reject the equivalence of the 
estimates when we treat the Interaction term as exogenous. Nevertheless, we interact the 
proposed instruments with Governance Spending to construct two additional instruments. 
The second IV approach is proposed by Lewbel (2012). The estimator exploits 
heteroscedasticity and higher moment conditions to construct internal instruments from the 
model’s data without the need for any external source of variation. There are two conditions 
for identification. First, the error terms in the first stage regression are heteroscedastic. The 
greater the degree of heteroscedasticity in the error processes, the stronger will be the 
correlation of the generated instruments with the endogenous variables and the stronger first-
stage prediction. We test the condition using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity in 
the first stage regressions. Second, there must exist a subset of the exogenous regressors 
uncorrelated with the covariance of the heteroscedastic error term and the second-stage error 
term. As discussed in Lewbel (2012), these conditions are normally satisfied in many models 
of endogeneity or mismeasurement in which error correlations are due to some unobserved 
common factor. The misreporting context represents a valid setting, as the main driving force 
of endogeneity discussed above is either the NPO’s unobserved characteristics or 
mismeasurement error. There are two caveats. First, using higher moment conditions is likely 
to provide less reliable estimates as it is not known how robust the results are to 
misspecification (Lewbel, 2012). Second, we are unable to acknowledge any economic 
intuition underlying the instruments. To address these concerns, we follow previous studies 
using the method (such as Emran and Hou, 2013; Loy et al., 2016; Caliendo et al., 2017), and 
                                                 
25 Popular predictors related to employment are executive salaries (Keating et al., 2008), the size of the committee 
board, the presence of the audit committee (Krishnan and Yetman, 2011; see Garven et al., 2016 for a fuller 
discsussion in the non-profit literature). We are not able to include any of these variables due to data unavailability. 
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supplement the set of internal instruments with our instruments to improve the efficiency of 
the estimator. We describe the estimator’s intuition in Appendix 8.5.  
Finally, the recorded spending on accounting and auditing services could also be subject 
to both measurement error and confounders. We argue it is not a serious concern for three 
reasons. First, governance spending is often a part of the contract conditions externally set by 
funding bodies to warrant the transparency of charities (Hofmann and McSwain, 2016). 
Second, like Charitable Spending, the attenuation caused by mismeasurement would bias the 
estimates downward but not alter the signs of the estimate for Governance Spending. Third, 
the confounding effect of any unobserved commitment of the NPO would be mitigated by the 
various control variables, such as NPO size, volunteers, and whether the reports are audited. 
Another concern is that Governance Spending could be endogenous, even though it is a sectoral 
norm that governance costs are relatively fixed and required by external bodies to fulfil their 
legal duties (see Hyndman and McConville, 2016, and Thakor, 2015 for a theoretical account). 
For completeness, we experiment with treating Governance Spending as endogenous. As there 
is no reliable instrument for the variable, we use Lewbel’s (2012) estimator to undertake the 
experiment and find qualitatively unchanged results. However, the respective Hausman test of 
endogeneity fails to reject the equivalence of treating the variable as exogenous at 5%. For that 
reason, we prefer treating Governance Spending as an exogenous variable in our main analysis.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and Table 3 compares the averages of the variables by 
conformity to Benford’s Law for the sample used in the main analysis. As expected, 
conforming NPOs do have lower measures of deviation from the Benford distribution, as 
measured by MAD, 𝜒2, and KS statistics. Over the period of 2007 – 2015, on average, UK 
NPOs spend 76% of their annual income on charitable activities, and 4% on governance 
activities. The maximum values for the proportions of the total income spent on the two 
activities are large (nearly 800% and 100% of the total income, respectively). It is possible for 
NPOs to spend eight times their income on these activities if they have access to endowments. 
Of the sampled NPOs, 16% receive endowment funds. There is a clear difference in charitable 
spending between conforming and deviating NPOs. Deviating NPOs appear to spend more on 
charitable spending, be older, submit more annual reports, but receive less government or 
restricted income, and record more losses from investment. The figures for governance 
spending, size (total assets) and being externally audited are statistically indistinguishable 
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between the two. There is also no difference in social security contribution and employment 
size (our proposed instruments) between the two types, supporting our intuition that these 
variables should not directly correlate with the misreporting behaviour of the NPOs.  
Figure 3 plots the histograms of the three variables of interest: the MAD statistic, 
Governance Spending and Charitable Spending. Unsurprisingly, a large portion of the UK 
charities report a low percentage of total income spent on governance activities, echoing the 
survey results from Woodwell and Bartczak (2008) that 80% of the US non-profits lack 
financial resources for overhead and accounting costs. In contrast, a large portion of the UK 
charities report spending at least 80% of their total income on charitable activities. Panel B 
plots the distribution of the MAD statistic, resembling a normal distribution.26 We report other 
descriptive statistics in Table A2. 
Figure 3. Histograms of the measures of misreporting and key expenses 
 
Note: Panel A plots histograms of Governance Spending and Charitable Spending as the 
percentages of the total income. Panel B plots the histogram of the MAD statistic. Number of 
bins is 100 for both panels. For presentation purposes, we exclude the top 1% of each variable 
from the histograms.  
                                                 
26 Figure A2 in the Appendix 8 plots the statistics over five quantiles of key NPO characteristics such as charitable 
spending, governance spending, and size (total assets). 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by conformity to the Benford distribution 
VARIABLES All Deviate Conform Difference t-stat 
MAD statistic 0.038 0.042 0.027 0.015*** 52.282 
𝜒2 35.44 41.598 16.835 24.763*** 47.747 
KS 0.129 0.15 0.065 0.086*** 75.347 
Charitable spending 0.763 0.77 0.741 0.029*** 4.000 
Governance spending 0.043 0.044 0.042 0.002 0.404 
Size (Total Assets, £ million) 9.551 8.894 11.537 -2.643 -1.193 
Age 20.87 21.546 18.842 2.703*** 8.046 
Volunteers 9.717 7.271 17.108 -9.837* -1.73 
Being audited (binary) 0.873 0.871 0.877 -0.005 -0.702 
Receive government grants (binary) 0.384 0.364 0.445 -0.081*** -7.366 
Zero fundraising (binary) 0.542 0.543 0.54 0.002 0.214 
Losses from investments (binary) 0.173 0.179 0.153 0.026*** 3.07 
Receive restricted income (binary) 0.481 0.474 0.504 -0.030*** -2.655 
Have endowment funds (binary) 0.160 0.159 0.165 -0.006 -0.74 
Income from Donations/Grants (%) 0.816 0.812 0.828 -0.015*** -2.676 
Number of non-zeros 200.7 202.592 195.183 7.409*** 5.208 
Number of yearly reports 5.626 5.696 5.414 0.282*** 9.67 
Headcounts 21.22 21.437 20.558 0.879 0.379 
Social security spending (£) 77.294 77599 76372 -1226.174 -0.149 
Observations 10,322 2,567  7,555   
Note: *** p <0.01, * p < 0.1. Observations are at the NPO level. The non-binary variables are 
averages of all NPO-year respective financial items over the period. The binary variables equal 
1 if the respective variables take at least one non-zero value during the surveyed period. 
Conformity is based on Kolmogorov – Smirnov (KS) tests of the observed distribution following 
the expected distribution. At the 5% significance level, the subsample “Deviate” (“Conform”) 
contains NPOs whose observed distribution deviates from (conforms to) the Benford 









5.2. Regression results 
Table 3 shows estimates from an OLS with full control variables, the 2SLS with our proposed 
instruments, and the Lewbel’s (2012) estimator.27 To check how sensitive our instruments are 
to the specification (Headcount, and Headcount × Governance Spending; Social Security 
Spending, and Social Security Spending × Governance Spending), we first alternatively 
include either pair of instruments and test for the exogeneity of the Interaction term using the 
Wu-Hausman test. If we fail to reject the null of statistical equivalence when treating the 
Interaction term as being exogenous, we remove it from the set of endogenous variables in the 
sequential specification. We also experiment with treating Governance Spending as exogenous. 
Using the internal instruments generated by Lewbel’s estimator, we test whether it is 
statistically equivalent. In Table A3 we fail to reject the equivalence when treating Governance 
Spending as exogenous. This evidence further supports the theoretical assumption in the 
literature and our premise that Governance Spending should be treated as externally determined 
by external bodies. Column 3 presents our preferred 2SLS specification with control variables. 
To improve the efficiency, our preferred specification of the Lewbel’s estimation is estimated 
using GMM (Baum et al., 2012). To check the robustness of our traditional instrumentation, 
we exclude the external instruments and rely on internally generated instruments from the 
Lewbel’s estimator. We report a range of similar results from other specifications when we treat 
Governance Spending as endogenous in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
Once we control for a battery of organisational characteristics or using the two IV 
strategies, we find robust evidence for the thresholds laid out in the theoretical predictions.  The 
marginal effects of both Charitable Spending and Governance Spending on the measure of 
misreporting (MAD) are non-monotonic and dependent on the magnitudes (the thresholds) of 
the other expense. To determine the thresholds in our dataset for UK charities, we derive the 
following thresholds from Equation (21).  
?̃? = −
Coefficient of 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
Coefficient of 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
(22) 
?̃? = −
Coefficient of 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
Coefficient of 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚
(23) 
Figure 4 visualises the values of these thresholds. Calculations, using the OLS with control 
variables and the Lewbel’s estimation (our preferred specification), suggest that ?̃? ≈ 70% and 
                                                 
27 We use Variance Inflation Factor analysis (AIF) to see if multicollinearity drives our results. Small condition 
indices (substantially lower than 10) indicates it is not the case.  
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?̃? ≈ 15%. That is, only organisations who exert relatively high effort in charitable activities 
(spending at least 70% of their total income), would have a lower measure of misreporting 
when they spend more on governance activities. Otherwise, higher governance spending need 
not translate into a higher level of reporting accuracy. Similarly, only when charities spend 
sufficiently on auditing and accounting activities (about 15% of total income), will charities 
performing well (spending more on charitable activities) be associated with a lower level of 
misreporting. To put these numbers into perspective, only 7% of the charities in our sample 
spend more than 15% of their total income on governance activities. Despite being suggestive, 
our threshold of 15% highlights the lack of resources spent on governance activities in the UK 
sector. The result supports the call for increased support from granting donors for overhead 
costs and accounting expenses, as documented by Singh (2015).  
Figure 2. The predictive marginal effects on inaccuracy of financial reports 
 
Note: Margin plots of the marginal effects obtained after our preferred Lewbel (2012)  
estimation. The left (right) panel shows marginal effect of charitable spending (governance 
spending) on the predicted measures of misreporting. Lines with cirles (squares, diammonds) 
represent the respective marginal effect when the value of the variable on the horizontal axis is 
below (above, at) the threshold (0.15 for governance spending, 0.70 for charitable spending). 







Table 3 also provides interesting estimates for the other organisational characteristics. 
Contradictory to Krishnan et al. (2006), size and age are positively correlated with the amount 
of information irregularities. The result is not surprising in the non-profit literature. For 
example, Keating and Erumkin (2003) suggest larger non-profits with manual accounting 
systems may be prone to errors if they do not change the system to adapt to the loading tasks. 
Having reports audited, receiving government grants, restricted income or endowment funds 
are significantly correlated with lower levels of irregularities. Reporting zero fundraising and 
losses from investments/pension funds do not significantly correlate with worse reporting 
accuracy, despite hypothetical motivations for the NPO to falsify their data. NPOs receiving 
more income from the public or grants, however, report more accurately. This result is 
consistent with the explanation of reputation concern – those who would like to remain 
trustworthy are more likely to behave well. Having more non-zero financial items recorded, 
while controlling for the number of yearly reports, is significantly correlated with better 
accuracy. One reason could be that NPOs disclosing more non-zeros are indeed those NPOs 
reporting truthfully. In Appendix 8.6.4, we find similar results when we control for the 
possibility that some NPOs report fewer non-zero transactions to withhold information. 
Table 4 supports the statistical validity of our instruments. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-
statistics are large in all cases, supporting the relevance of our traditional instruments and the 
instruments generated by Lewbel’s estimator. We also reject the null of homoscedastic errors 
in the first-stage estimations, satisfying the first identification condition of the Lewbel’s (2012) 
estimator. We fail to reject the null that the traditional instrumentation is not overidentified 
using the Hansen J statistics. To test for the overidentification of the Lewbel’s (2012), we also 
report the C-statistic to test for the orthogonality of suspect instruments (see Hayashi, 2000, 
pp. 227-8). C-statistics provide additional information over Hansen J statistics. For a model 
with many instruments, a Hansen-Sargan test may have little power (Baum et al., 2003). In 
addition, C-statistics allows us to test for the statistical validity of suspect instruments, that is, 
the instruments that we deem to have statistical validity. Since we wish to test for the robustness 
of our results using the two traditional instruments, C-statistics allows us to exclude the 
overidentification conditions associated with the traditional instruments, only testing the 
statistical validity of the internally generated instruments. Both the Hansen J statistics and C-
statistics in Table 4 fail to reject the null of overidentification, supporting the statistical validity 
of our instruments. As a cautionary note, our tests of overidentification cannot test for the 
excludability assumption, but instead the coherency of the instruments, that is, whether the 
instruments identify the same parameters (Parente and Santos Silva, 2012). 
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Table 3. Main results for the determinants of misreporting for British charities 
VARIABLES 
Dependent variable: MAD statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS with controls 2SLS Lewbel’s (2012) 
     
Charitable spending  0.300 3.362*** 1.981** 2.359*** 
 (0.547) (0.589) (0.836) (0.731) 
Interaction term -7.848 -16.251*** -10.613*** -16.111*** 
 (5.303) (5.513) (3.364) (5.123) 
Governance spending  13.585*** 11.957*** 6.298*** 11.279*** 
 (2.975) (3.130) (1.934) (3.120) 
Size  0.515*** 0.925*** 0.525*** 
(logged total assets)  (0.083) (0.237) (0.081) 
Age  0.080*** 0.055*** 0.079*** 
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) 
Volunteers  -0.208 -0.146 -0.151 
(number of volunteers)  (0.319) (0.253) (0.311) 
Being audited  -2.483*** -2.509*** -2.456*** 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)  (0.463) (0.495) (0.461) 
Receive government grants   -1.974*** -1.910*** -1.961*** 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)  (0.263) (0.278) (0.262) 
Zero fundraising   -0.189 0.819 -0.220 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)  (0.271) (0.666) (0.270) 
Losses from investments  0.354 0.416 0.345 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)  (0.347) (0.372) (0.345) 
Receive restricted income  -0.543* -0.544* -0.519* 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)  (0.292) (0.312) (0.291) 
Have endowment funds   -1.102*** -0.635 -1.187*** 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)  (0.345) (0.466) (0.345) 
Income from Donations/Grants  -1.583*** -5.644** -1.288** 
(% of total income)  (0.577) (2.219) (0.574) 
Number of non-zeros  -0.170*** -0.193*** -0.169*** 
  (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
Number of yearly reports  4.069*** 4.883*** 4.026*** 
  (0.209) (0.513) (0.209) 
Constant 37.313*** 42.401*** 27.689*** 42.922*** 
 (0.449) (1.520) (7.933) (1.542) 
     
R-squared 0.004 0.263 0.174 0.262 
Observations 10,322 10,322 10,322 10,322 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) and (2) are 
baseline results. Column (3) use Headcount, and Headcount × Governance Spending; Social Security 
spending, and Social Security spending × Governance Spending as instruments for Charitable 
Spending and Interaction Term, treating Governance Spending as exogenous. Columns (4) reports our 
preferred estimates from the Lewbel’s estimator. The unit of observation is individual British NPO. 
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Table 4. Diagnostic tests for the IV estimations 
Panel A. Diagnostic tests for the main estimation 
 Estimators 
2SLS Lewbel’s (2012) 




(weak identification) Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics  18.682 128.623 
(overidentification) Hansen J statistics for 2SLS/C-statistics for 





(endogeneity) Wu-Husman test of endogeneity 





Panel B. Diagnostics for first-stage estimations of the Lewbel’s estimators 
First-stage estimation for Charitable spending 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg statistics for heteroskedastic errors 




First-stage estimation for Interaction term 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg statistics for heteroskedastic 




Note: Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics are under the null that instruments are weak for iid being 
violated. Wu-Hausman tests are for equivalence of the estimates under exogeneity. Breusch-
























6. Sensitivity Analyses  
In this section, we present an exercise using within-NPO variations to compliment the between-
NPO comparison above. Since the data span an eight-year period, we can separate the sample 
into two periods (2008 – 2011 and 2012 – 2015) while maintaining the threshold of non-zeros 
(100). We first split the sample into two four-year intervals and re-calculate the measures of 
misreporting and the explanatory variables as described in Section 4.1 for each. We then match 
the two parts and obtain a panel dataset of 4318 NPO-year observations (2159 NPOs that have 
at least 100 non-zero financial points in each period).  
Despite losing observations, the within-NPO exercise has three advantages over the 
between-NPO comparison. First, the within-NPO analysis allows us to control for both time-
variant and time-invariant characteristics of the NPOs. Since the annual reports were collected 
in waves, the NPOs could have organisation-specific reasons to misreport the financial 
statements, such as the inherent tendency to manipulate the financial reports or to make human 
errors (accounting competence). By focusing on the dynamics of the Charitable Spending and 
Governance Spending variables over the two periods we mitigate concerns of the measurement 
error bias that could result from the tendency of the NPOs to manipulate these variables in both 
periods. Second, by controlling for time fixed effects, we mitigate concerns that changes in 
macroeconomic conditions in the UK and the charity sector have driven our results. Finally, by 
having two different intervals, we demonstrate that our results are not driven by the aggregation 
of the data.  
Table 5 presents our results. Controlling for within-NPO time-invariant and time-varying 
NPO characteristics (omitted to save space), we obtain the same thresholds as in our main 
analysis. Columns (2) and (3) suggest British charities seem to misreport more intensively over 
time and the temporal difference is statistically significant. One potential explanation is that 
because there are more opportunities for funding in the post-crisis period 2012 to 2015, NPOs 
are more inclined to produce more favourable financial reports to attract the funding.  
We perform four additional sensitivity checks in Appendix 8.6 and another two in the 
Online Appendix. While the precise magnitudes of the estimates vary depending on the sub-
samples, the major conclusions remain. Specifically, our results are not sensitive to: the 
constructing algorithms of our measures; the cut-offs of non-zeros we use in the construction 
of the measures; extreme values (outliers) of NPO sizes, spending on charitable or governance 
activities; and finally, potential selection bias from non-disclosure as we construct the measures 
for organisations that have at least 100 financial figures after pooling yearly data.  
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Table 5. Fixed effect models for misreporting over two periods 
VARIABLES 
Dependent variable: MAD statistic 
(1) (2) (3) 
OLS OLS OLS 
    
Charitable spending  3.615** 3.100* 3.377** 
 (1.822) (1.699) (1.731) 
Interaction term -13.557*** -8.505* -9.405** 
 (4.793) (4.422) (4.445) 
Governance spending  7.916 6.479 7.143 
 (6.351) (5.287) (5.294) 
Year Dummy (Period 2 = 1)  2.919*** 2.333*** 
  (0.287) (0.744) 
Constant 35.092*** 34.829*** 19.786* 
 (1.480) (1.375) (10.307) 
NPO-Year observations 4318 4318 4318 
Number of NPOs 2159 2159 2159 
Control Variables No No Yes 
NPO fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. To obtain the sample, we split the original 
sample into two periods 2008 – 2011 and 2012 – 2015. We pool four years of data in 
each sample and re-calculate measures of misreporting and explanatory variables as 

























7. Concluding remarks 
We provide the first systematic study on the reporting behaviour of non-profits. We advocate 
the use of Benford’s Law as an alternative measure of financial misreporting. We find financial 
figures from 25% of the charities collected in the UK Third Sector Data during the period 2008-
2015 do not conform to Benford’s Law at the 5% significance level, suggesting potential 
irregularities. The approach is a computationally easy and useful screening step to identify 
potential organisations for an extensive investigation, but we emphasise that it does not provide 
definitive evidence of fraudulent behaviour, nor does it substitute auditing. Instead, we view 
our method as a way to improve the efficiency of assessing charities’ financial datasets, reduce 
the costs of monitoring the sector, and put pressure on non-profits to conform with the rising 
accountability norm.  
We also support a leading voice from the charity sector, Singh (2015), that over-spending 
on governance activities and back-offices could be counter-productive by failing to motivate 
the organisations to adhere to accountability. A higher requirement of governance spending 
and stricter oversight mechanism would be effective in improving the accuracy of financial 
reporting only when the NPOs are already incentivised to exert more effort (for example, a 
larger share of income spent on charitable activities). Our preferred estimates suggest that 
spending at least 15% of the total income on governance activities would help better 
performing charities provide reports that are more accurate. Unless funders and the public 
consider support for these governance activities in their funding package, the accountability 
pressure could distort philanthropic agendas of the NPOs. Although our thresholds should be 
interpreted as indicative due to non-experimental data, our work provides the first step to 
identify relevant indicators to assist regulators or donors when assessing programme ratios and 
giving support packages to overhead activities. We hope to open further research and 





8. Appendix  
Table A1. Financial items reported by the NPOs 
Panel A.  Panel B. 
1. ASSETS 5. INVESTMENTS 
Net Assets Investments 
Net Current Assets  Investment – Rent from property 
Current Assets Investment – Dividends  
Cash in hand or at the bank Investments – Interest on deposits 
Debtors  
Current Investments 6. OTHER INCOMES 
Stocks Voluntary income– Government Sector 
Creditors due within one year Voluntary income– Central Government 
Pension Assets Voluntary income– Local Government 
Fixed Assets  Voluntary income– Regional Government 
Intangible Fixed Assets Voluntary income– Town and Parish Councils 
Investment Assets Voluntary income– NHS Trusts 
Tangible Fixed Assets Voluntary income– European Government 
Creditors due after one year Voluntary income– International Government Agency 
Other Assets Voluntary income– Foreign Governments  
Provisions  Voluntary income– Public Corporations  
 Voluntary income– Universities  
 Voluntary income– Devolved Governments 
2. EXPENDITURES Voluntary income– Business Sector 
Expenditures  Voluntary income– Nonprofit sector 
Expenditures on Charitable Activities Voluntary income– General public 
Expenditures on generating funds Voluntary income– Government Sector 
Expenditures on fundraising and publicity   
Expenditures on investment management  7. STAFF 
Expenditure on trading subsidiary Number of Full-time staff (FTE) 
Costs of obtaining voluntary income Number of visitors  
Costs of processing grants Number of other non-stipendiary participants   
Total costs of governance * Staff headcount 
Costs of Accounting and Audit Fees Number of Volunteers 
Costs of Administrative 
Other Governance Expenditure 
Number of Audit and Accounting staff 
  
3. FUNDS 8. OTHER INFORMATION 
Total Funds Depreciation (value) 
Endowment Funds Endowment received (value) 
Income Funds Revaluations of fixed assets 
Restricted Funds Gains/Losses on Investments 
Unrestricted Funds  Interest payments 
Other Funds Income by fund * 
Pension Funds 
 
Income from endowment 
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4. INCOME Other income 
Incoming resources (Total)* Restricted income 
Charitable activities – Government Sector Unrestricted income 
Charitable activities – Central Government Other financial values 
Charitable activities – Local Government Gains/Losses on pension funds 
Charitable activities – Regional Government Reserves 
Charitable activities – Town and Parish Councils Staff costs 
Charitable activities – NHS Trusts Other staff costs 
Charitable activities – European Government Pension costs 
Charitable activities – International Government 
Agency 
Social security costs 
Charitable activities – Foreign Governments  Wages and salaries 
Charitable activities – Public Corporations  Support costs 
Charitable activities – Universities  Irrecoverable VAT 
Charitable activities – Devolved Governments Tangible fixed assets 
Charitable activities – Business Sector Additions 
Charitable activities – Nonprofit sector Net book value – beginning 
Charitable activities – General public Disposals 
Charitable activities – Government Sector Net book value – end  
  
Income from Funds (Total)*  
Generating funds – Government Sector  
Generating funds – Central Government  
Generating funds – Local Government  
Generating funds – Regional Government  
Generating funds – Town and Parish Councils  
Generating funds – NHS Trusts  
Generating funds – European Government  
Generating funds – International Government Agency  
Generating funds – Foreign Governments   
Generating funds – Public Corporations   
Generating funds – Universities   
Generating funds – Devolved Governments  
Generating funds – Business Sector  
Generating funds – Nonprofit sector  
Generating funds – General public  
Generating funds – General public  
  
Note: * indicates items not included in the Benford’s Law digital analysis due to duplicate. All financial items 
are from the surveys and recorded in Alcock, & Mohan (2015) in Sterling (£). For purpose of the study, we 
convert non-Sterling figures to the contemporary values in Sterling (£). Because of the scale invariability 







Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
VARIABLES Mean SD Min Max 
MAD statistic 0.038 0.014 0.006 0.124 
𝜒2 35.44 25.17 1.328 326.2 
KS 0.129 0.062 0.014 0.524 
Charitable spending 0.763 0.315 0 7.797 
Governance spending 0.043 0.092 0 1.01 
Size (Total Assets, £ million) 9.551 97.27 6.93e-05 8,547 
Age 20.87 14.80 0.564 50.89 
Volunteers 9.717 249.8 0 17,500 
Being audited  0.873 0.334 0 1 
Receive government grants  0.384 0.486 0 1 
Zero fundraising 0.542 0.498 0 1 
Losses from investments 0.173 0.378 0 1 
Receive restricted income  0.481 0.500 0 1 
Have endowment funds  0.160 0.367 0 1 
Income from Donations/Grants 0.816 0.252 0 1 
Number of non-zeros 200.7 62.56 100 406 
Number of yearly reports 5.626 1.285 2 8 
Headcount 21.22 101.8 0 3,192 
Social security spending 
(£’000) 
77.294 361.013 0 1.517e+04 
Note: The sample is restricted to 10322 British charities whose number non-zero 


















Figure A1. Distribution of skewness and mean-to-median ratio of the aggregated data 
 
Note: The aggregated data are conducted by aggregating the yearly financial data of each 
charity. The figure plots the distributions of skewness values and mean-to-median ratios for the 
10,322 charities that have at least 100 non-zero financial items in their aggregated data. The 
two panels clearly demonstrate that the aggregated data for each charity have (1) positively 
skewed distribution (Panel A) and (2) mean larger than median (Panel B). As discussed in 




















0 2 4 6 8 10
skewness

























0 25 50 75 100 125 150
Mean-to-Median Ratio
Panel B: Mean > Median for the aggregated data of each NPO
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8.1. Proof of Lemma 1 
Given 𝜔 = 𝑤0 + 𝑤1(𝜌𝑎 + 𝜂 + 𝑏 − 𝑏






(𝑏 − 𝜏)2 − 𝑐(𝑏 − 𝑏𝑒), the induced 
wealth is normally distributed 𝜔 = N(𝜇, 𝑑2) with 𝜇 = 𝑤0 +𝑤1(𝜌𝑎 + 𝑏 − 𝑏






(𝑏 − 𝜏)2 − 𝑐(𝑏 − 𝑏𝑒) and 𝑑2 = 𝑤1
2𝜎𝜂




















(A1) and (A2) imply that: 













that leads to 𝐸[𝑢(𝜔)] = −exp(𝑟𝜇 +
𝑟2𝑑2
2
) = −exp(𝑟CE).  
Or CE = 𝜇 −
𝑟𝑑2
2
. The proof completes.  
8.2.  Proof of Proposition 1 











































− 𝜆), we have: 
𝜕𝑎∗
𝜕𝑔
> 0, ∀g ≥ 0 (A5) 









+ 𝜏   (A6) 




= sign 𝑇(𝑔) (A7) 








𝜆 + 𝑐 ∓ √(𝜆 + 𝑐)𝜆 +
𝛽(𝜆 + 𝑐)
𝛽 + Δ
𝛽 − 𝑐(𝛽 + Δ)
(A8)
 




As we assume 𝛽 > 𝑐(𝛽 + 𝛿), following Descartes’ rule of signs we have 𝑔1 < 0 < 𝑔2. 
To save space, we provide a graphical proof for ease of interpretation. Figure A2 shows that, 
given 𝑔 ≥ 0  sign 𝑇(𝑔) < 0 if and only if 𝑔 ≥ 𝑔2 and sign 𝑇(𝑔) > 0 iff 𝑔 < 𝑔2.  
Following (A6), sign 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑔
< 0 if and only if 𝑔 ≥ 𝑔2 and sign 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑔
> 0 if and only if 𝑔 <








⁄ < 0 if and only if 𝑔 ≥ 𝑔2 and 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑎∗
| 𝜕𝑔 > 0 if and 
only if 𝑔 < 𝑔2. Set 𝑔2=?̃? and the proof completes.  
Figure A2. How sign 
∂b∗
∂g
 and sign T(g) behave when g varies in (0, +∞). 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration.  
8.3.  Proof of Proposition 2  
Proof: As  
𝜕𝑎∗
𝜕𝑔
> 0 ∀g ≥ 0, 𝑔 ≥ ?̃? if and only if 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎𝑔 = ?̃? and 𝑔 < ?̃? if and only if 𝑎 < 𝑎𝑔 =
?̃? with ?̃? = 𝑔2 specified as in Figure A2.  Figure A2 also confirms that 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑔
< 0 if and only if 
𝑔 ≥ ?̃?; we immediately have that 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑔
< 0 if and only if 𝑎 ≥ ?̃?.  







8.4. Additional summary statistics 
Figure A3. Measures of misreporting (MAD) by quantiles of NPO characteristics 
 
Notes: The MAD statistic is plotted over five quantiles of nine NPO characteristics. 
8.5. Lewbel’s (2012) IV estimator 
Assume that the model of interest is: 𝑌1 = 𝑋
′𝛽1 + 𝛾1𝑌2 + 1 and the endogeneity problem of 
𝑌2 emerges from 𝑌2 = 𝑋
′𝛽2 + 2  (B. 7), where 𝑋 is a set of exogenous regressors. The 
traditional IV approach assumes that some elements of vector 𝑋 are non-zero in (19) (strong 
identification) but zero in (18) (exclusion restriction). Lewbel’s theorem shows that the 
parameters are identified if there exist exogenous variables 𝑍 ⊆ 𝑋 and heteroscedasticity in the 
data such that 𝐸(𝑍′ 1) = 𝐸(𝑍
′
2) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 1 2) = 0 and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 2
2) ≠  0. The variables 
(𝑍 − 𝐸(𝑍)) 2 can then be used as instruments for 𝑌2. Lewbel proves that the assumptions 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 2
2) ≠ 0 and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 1 2) = 0 are analogous to the two criteria under the traditional IV 
approach and they ensure (𝑍 − 𝐸(𝑍)) 2 to be a valid instrumentation. In our context, assuming 
both Charitable spending and Interaction term are endogenous, the estimator can be 
implemented as follows: 
i. Regress Charitable spending on the set 𝑋𝑖 by OLS and save the residuals, 1𝑖. 
ii. Regress Interaction term on the set 𝑋𝑖 by OLS and save the residuals, 2𝑖. 
iii. Form instruments 𝑍𝑖𝑗 = (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋?̅?) 𝑗𝑖 with 𝑗 = 1,2 
iv. Estimate the main equation of interest (16) via GMM using 𝑍𝑖𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,2 as instruments 
for Charitable spending and Interaction Term. GMM is preferred to 2SLS as the set of 
exogenous variables 𝑋𝑖 contains more than one element, 2SLS becomes prone to over-
identification and should be efficiently estimated with GMM (Baum et al., 2003).  
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8.6.  Robustness checks 
8.6.1. Sensitivity to the measurement of reporting inaccuracy 
We replace the MAD statistic by three alternatives: 𝜒2 (Chi-square statistics), KS statistics, and 
the binary variable Deviate indicating whether the non-profit’s data deviate from the Benford 
distribution. Section 2 specifies how these measures are constructed. Table A4 reports the 
estimates from OLS with full controls, our preferred 2SLS, and Lewbel’s (2012) estimator. 
Although we cannot directly compare the magnitudes of the coefficients, all the signs and 
significance are unchanged, supporting our results’ robustness. 
8.6.2. Sensitivity to the cut-off of the number of non-zero items 
One concern when using Benford’s Law in a digital analysis is the cut-off of the number of 
non-zero financial observations. In the main analysis, we use the rule-of-thumb threshold of 
100. We explore how our results are sensitive to the cut-off. We also address the concern that 
some non-profits may have withheld some information by recording zero financial 
transactions. If the mechanisms underlying the decision to withholding information and 
manipulating the reported information are similar, we should not observe any systematically 
different results when we include NPOs with more zero financial items, who are less likely to 
withhold information. We vary the cut-off from 115 to 65 and re-do the analysis 50 times. The 
unreported results are quantitatively unchanged, only the estimates become less precise when 
the thresholds fall below 75. We conclude that the cut-off choice does not drive the results. 
8.6.3. Sensitivity to the sample used 
As the distributions of total assets and spending in the UK third sector are heavily skewed, 
there are two concerns. First, our results may be driven by outliers. Second, the skewness could 
introduce heteroscedasticity to our linear estimation. Using the specifications in the main 
analysis, we perform various trimming exercises: alternatively excluding the top and (or) the 
bottom 1%, 5%, 10%, 25% percentile of the Size (total assets), Governance Spending, and 
Charitable Spending. Figure A5 summarises the main results from this check. Overall, the 
magnitudes and the significance of the main estimates are robust to trimming off outliers and 







Figure A4. Robustness to varying the cut-offs of non-zero financial points 
 
Note: The estimates of the three variables of interest are in a descending order of the number 
of non-zeros used from 65 to 115. For example, the top estimate is for Charitable Spending at 
the cut-off of 65. Confidence level is at 95%. The graph shows a clear robustness to our main 
results when varying the cut-offs.  
Figure A5. Robustness to excluding various ranges of outliers 
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8.6.4. Controlling for potential informational non-disclosure  
Since we exclude NPOs with fewer than 100 non-zero financial items, sample selection could 
be an issue. The excluded NPOs could either have operated in more straightforward activities 
which generate no significant transactions or have strategically withheld information by 
recording some significant items as zeros. Although our main results are not sensitive to the 
threshold of 100, we use the Heckman sample correction to check our results’ robustness. 
Let 𝑇 be a binary variable taking value 1 if the NPO reports at least 100 non-zeros in our 
sample and 0 otherwise. In the first stage, we explore the selection of NPOs that record more 
than 100 non-zero financial items by running a probit regression of 𝑇 on explanatory variables 
𝑋𝑖. In the second stage, we include the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the predicted 
individual probabilities in the first stage as additional explanatory variables. Table A3 presents 
the estimates for the two stages. Even when controlling for potential selection bias, due to 
excluding NPOs who record fewer than 100 non-zeros, our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged for all the four indices. We report Wald tests of independence under the null that the 
two decisions can be taken independently. Although we reject the null for the MAD statistic, 
we fail to do so for the other critical-based measures. The identification for this model is based 
on the normality assumption when the same covariates appear in both the two-stage equations. 
Despite being tenuous, we note that having losses from investment and reporting zero 
fundraising costs are significant determinants of providing more than 100 financial figures, 
while they are always insignificant in explaining the reporting inaccuracy. As such, these two 












 Table A3. Heckit estimator for missing observations for the four indices 
VARIABLES First Stage 
Second stage (degree of misreporting) 
MAD 𝜒2 KS statistics Deviate 
      
Charitable spending 0.13** 3.16*** 7.37*** 17.07*** 112.55*** 
 (0.53) (0.56) (1.19) (2.56) (18.12) 
Interaction term -0.12 -7.78*** -12.77** -38.50*** -185.67** 
 (0.21) (2.76) (5.08) (11.84) (72.30) 
Governance Spending 0.26** 5.68*** 10.92*** 31.27*** 163.69*** 
 (0.12) (1.57) (2.75) (7.41) (41.64) 
Size 
(logged total assets) 
0.27*** 0.61*** 1.60*** 2.42*** 18.20*** 
(0.14) (0.08) (0.18) (0.39) (2.90) 
Age -0.048*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.30*** 1.18*** 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.31) 
Volunteers 
 
10.27* -0.22 -0.45 -1.66* -28.44** 
(6.10) (0.31) (0.32) (0.86) (12.65) 
Being audited 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
8.40*** -2.37*** -2.81*** -9.29*** -34.24** 
(0.51) (0.47) (0.92) (2.20) (14.25) 
Receive government grants 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) 
6.84*** -1.94*** -3.29*** -7.75*** -43.50*** 
(0.54) (0.26) (0.55) (1.27) (9.67) 
Zero fundraising (1 = Yes, 0 = 
No) 
5.08*** -0.04 0.14 -0.65 13.11 
(0.48) (0.27) (0.56) (1.29) (9.46) 
Losses from investments 4.91*** 0.32 -0.25 0.71 -1.84 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (1.44) (0.35) (0.76) (1.66) (12.63) 
Receive restricted income 9.86*** -0.55* -0.95 -3.68*** -35.45*** 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.85) (0.29) (0.60) (1.41) (10.49) 
Have endowment funds 0.93 -1.03*** -2.97*** -5.76*** -32.24** 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.78) (0.34) (0.68) (1.62) (12.71) 
Income from donations -1.339 0.128 0.356 0.001 -0.511 
 (1.204) (3.781) (0.520) (0.003) (0.545) 
Number of yearly reports 17.27*** 4.25*** 7.81*** 13.32*** 56.40*** 
 (0.53) (0.21) (0.49) (0.99) (7.39) 
Number of non-zeros  -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.49*** -0.70*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.19) 












Note. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors are in parentheses. First-stage estimates probit 
of 𝑇 (= 1 if included in the digital analysis as having at least 100 non-zeros, 0 otherwise). Second stage 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.7. Additional Tables 
Table A5 compliments Table 4 in the main text for estimates of control variables for various 
estimators. We experiment with treating Governance Spending and the International Term as 
endogenous in specifications 2SLS (1) – (4) and Lewbel (1) – (2). We find similar results for 
the traditional 2SLS estimations. For the Lewbel’s estimations, the endogeneity tests all fail to 
reject the null of statistical exogeneity of Governance Spending. As such, we prefer our 
Lewbel’s estimation reported in the main analysis.  
Table A5. Reporting inaccuracy and NPO’s observable characteristics 
Variables 2SLS-1 2SLS-2 2SLS-3 2SLS-4 Lewbel-1 Lewbel-2 
       
Charitable spending  1.676** 2.047*** 2.389** 2.394** 0.156 0.167 
 (0.786) (0.704) (1.046) (1.201) (0.699) (0.854) 
Interaction term -10.761** -9.181*** -10.693** -10.654*** -6.018 7.592 
 (4.334) (3.155) (4.675) (3.595) (5.076) (8.022) 
Governance Spending  6.143*** 5.721*** 6.626** 6.614*** 4.382 0.604 
 (2.110) (1.872) (2.786) (2.441) (3.095) (3.875) 
       
Observations 10,322 10,322 10,322 10,322 10,322 10,322 
List of instruments 
Headcounts Yes Yes - - - - 
Social security spending - - Yes Yes - - 
Headcounts × 
Governance spending 
Yes Yes - - - - 
Social Security spending 
× Governance spending 
- - Yes Yes - - 
Treat the Interaction 
term as exogenous? 
No Yes No Yes Yes No 
Treat Governance 
spending as exogenous? 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
K-P F-stat for weak 
identification 











Endogeneity test for 
Interaction term  
0.45 - 4.78 - - 2.52 
[0.50] - [0.03] - - [0.12] 
Endogeneity test for 
Governance Spending  
- - - - 0.002 1.83 
- - - - [0.96] [0.18] 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, p-values in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
procedures for Lewbel’s estimations are performed by GMM. We report Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-
statistic to account for heteroscedasticity. Tests of endogeneity: Ho: the specified endogenous can be 
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1. Extension of the theoretical model 
 
We extend the theoretical model in the main analysis by allowing the level of unintentional 
human errors to be affected by the level of governance spending. The argument here is, despite 
not being established in the empirical literature, it could be argued that higher spending on 
governance and accounting activities could reduce the probability of human errors (such as 
coding errors or mistakes when inputting the numbers). Since this type of error occurs in 
specific organisations, we assume that an increased level of governance spending would reduce 
the variance of the organisation-specific uncertainty 𝜂 of the intermediate value 𝜃. That is, the 
performance measure of the organisation is less likely to be misreported due to random factors. 
We obtain a similar result for the existence of the thresholds. 
To prove the existence of the thresholds, we need to make the following assumption.  
Assumption OA1: For simplicity, we assume that the variance linearly decreases in the level 




) and the uncertainty is maximised when the NPO 
does not spend on governance spending 𝜂(0) ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜂
2), as in the main analysis.  
In contrast to the main analysis, we are not able to derive closed equilibria for the statics 
of interest. However, we show that the main theoretical predictions of the existence of the 
thresholds remain. 


























































 + 𝜏 (𝑂𝐴3) 
where we define 𝛽 =
𝜌2
𝛿
 and Δ = 𝑟𝜎𝜂
2 for convenience.  
Proposition OA1: When 𝑤1
∗ > 0, there exists a fixed threshold of the governance spending  
?̃? > 0 such that:  





> 0 if and only if  𝑔 < ?̃?  





< 0 if and only if  𝑔 > ?̃? 
Proof: The intuition is similar to the main model when the level of governance spending enters 











We rewrite 𝑎∗ as:  
3 
 











































































































































 decreases with 𝑔, again we have 
𝜕𝑎∗
𝜕𝑔
> 0, ∀g ≥ 0 (OA5) 












+ 𝜏   (OA6) 
Differentiating 𝑏∗ with respect to 𝑔 we have: 


















1 + 𝑔 + 𝜆






+ 𝑐 (𝑔𝛽 +
𝑔Δ


















= sign 𝑇(𝑔) (OA7) 
We examine sign 𝑇(𝑔) with respect to 𝑔. Note that from (OA2), for 𝑤1




 is sufficiently large or 𝜆 is sufficiently small. 
Notice that: 
𝑇(0) = 𝜆 + 𝑐 > 0 (OA8) 






2Δ𝑔 + 𝜆 − 𝜆𝑔 
(1 + 𝑔)3
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To show that 𝑇′(𝑔) has a unit root, we need have 𝑇′′(𝑔) < 0 or 𝑇′(𝑔) decreases in 𝑔 
and has no more than one root for 𝑔 ≥
𝜆
𝛽
. For this to hold, we need to assume the following 
plausible assumption: 
Assumption OA2. We either have a small probability of being detected (or a small 𝑐) or the 
NPO is highly risk-averse (or a large Δ). These assumptions are reasonable because the non-
profit distribution assumption.  
Using the L’Hopistal’s Rule, we have lim
𝑔→+∞ 
𝑇′(𝑔) = −2𝜆Δ lim
𝑔→+∞ 
𝑔 + 𝑐(𝑐 +
𝜆)𝛽 lim
𝑔→+∞ 
𝑔 < 0 (from Assumption OA2).  As such, there must exist a unique root 𝑔𝑇 of 𝑇
′(𝑔).  
Because 𝑇′(𝑔) decreases with 𝑔, 𝑇′(𝑔) > 0 for 𝑔 ∈ (0, 𝑔𝑇] and 𝑇
′(𝑔) < 0 for 𝑔 ∈
(𝑔𝑇 , +∞) or 𝑔𝑇 is a local maximum of 𝑇(𝑔). Since 𝑇(0) > 0 we must have 𝑇(𝑔𝑇) > 𝑇(0) >
0. Again, using the L’Hospital’s rule and considering the limit of 𝑇(𝑔): 
lim
𝑔→+∞ 
𝑇(𝑔) = −𝛽(Δ − 𝑐) lim
𝑔→+∞ 
𝑔2 < 0 
That is, there exists a unique root of 𝑇(𝑔) such that ?̃? ∈ (𝑔𝑇 , +∞). To save space, we 
provide a graphical proof for ease of interpretation. Figure OA1 shows that, given 𝑔 ≥ 0  




Following (OA7), sign 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑔
< 0 if and only if 𝑔 ≥ ?̃? and sign 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑔
> 0 if and only if 








⁄ < 0 if and only if 𝑔 ≥ ?̃? and 
𝜕𝑏∗
𝜕𝑎∗
| 𝜕𝑔 > 0 if 
and only if 𝑔 < ?̃?.  
The proof completes.  
Figure OA1. How sign 
∂b∗
∂g
 and sign T(g) behave when g varies in (0, +∞). 
 
Note. The smooth line is for illustration only. The left-hand (right-hand) side ?̃? represents the 

















2. Additional Tables 
2.1.   Robustness check: Replication for other measures of Governance Costs 
As in Table A1, there are two categories underneath the broad item “Total Governance Costs”: 
(i) Costs of Accounting and Audit Fees, and (ii) Costs of Administrative. In Table OA1, we 
replicate the main analysis replacing the aggregated variable Governance Spending by the two 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.2. Robustness check: Heterogeneity Analysis 
Since our model predicts how an NPO behaves could vary by its reliance on different sources 
of income (such as government grants, restricted income, or endowments and donations), the 
effects of interest could be heterogenous over NPOs. To address this concern, we conduct two 
pieces of heterogeneity analysis. First, we divide our sample into subgroups by three binary 
variables, namely, whether: (i) the NPO receives government grants, (ii) the NPO receives 
restricted income, and (iii) the NPO has an endowment. We report the estimates for each 
variable in Panel A, B, C in Table OA2 respectively.  
Second, we divide our sample into four subgroups of four quartiles of the Income by 
Donation/Grants variable and report the estimates for each quartile in Table OA3. Given 
government grants, restricted income and endowments only account for 38.4%, 48.1% and 16% 
of NPOs income we refrain from dividing the sample in this way for the actual (continuous) 
variables (see Table 2). Many NPOs receive zero income from these sources and dividing the 
sample by the actual incomes from these sources would lead to little variation in the subgroups. 
As reported in Table OA2 and Table OA3, even though the magnitudes are different (mainly 
due to different subsamples used), the signs and significance of the estimates of interest are 
largely in line with our main results. We use quartiles to split the sample into four groups here 
to retain substantial sample sizes for each subgroup, but (unreported) exercises using quintiles 

















Table OA2. Heterogeneity Analysis (Dependent variable: MAD_statistics) 
Panel A. By whether the NPO receives government grants 
 Receive Government Grants = Yes Receive Government Grants = No 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS Lewbel OLS 2SLS Lewbel 
       
Charitable Spending 4.374*** 5.356 4.459*** 3.334*** 28.708*** 1.649** 
 (0.903) (14.259) (1.307) (0.721) (10.277) (0.800) 
Interaction Term -20.020** -139.365** -22.597*** -17.046*** -51.112 -8.116 
 (8.385) (67.580) (6.852) (6.225) (46.221) (6.186) 
Governance Spending 20.711*** 76.396* 22.090*** 7.485** 38.905* 2.129 
 (4.868) (40.287) (4.421) (3.504) (23.492) (3.564) 
Observations 3,965 3,965 3,965 6,357 6,357 6,357 
R-squared 0.242 0.158 0.242 0.237 -0.043 0.236 
Panel B. By whether the NPO receives restricted income 
 Receive Restricted Income = Yes Receive Restricted Income = No 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS Lewbel OLS 2SLS Lewbel 
       
Charitable Spending 6.631*** 10.113 5.798*** 2.124*** 4.387 1.571* 
 (0.782) (12.069) (1.207) (0.742) (6.954) (0.833) 
Interaction Term -36.415*** -47.563 -35.863*** -9.243 -40.278 -11.698** 
 (8.443) (53.530) (9.226) (7.041) (30.465) (5.396) 
Governance Spending 30.351*** 38.475 29.784*** 6.458* 20.951 7.176** 
 (5.528) (32.974) (6.049) (3.799) (16.072) (3.485) 
Observations 4,965 4,965 4,965 5,357 5,357 5,357 
R-squared 0.186 0.182 0.186 0.208 0.203 0.207 
Panel C. By whether the NPO has endowment 
 Has endowment = Yes Has endowment = No 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS Lewbel OLS 2SLS Lewbel 
       
Charitable Spending 4.787*** 3.903* 1.934 3.059*** 7.176 2.426*** 
 (1.204) (2.344) (1.708) (0.664) (6.057) (0.758) 
Interaction Term -10.535 -13.291* -0.832 -16.050*** -85.751* -15.601*** 
 (11.965) (7.097) (9.047) (5.962) (51.835) (5.390) 
Governance Spending 7.434 7.923* -0.287 11.836*** 44.899** 11.256*** 
 (6.233) (4.457) (4.729) (3.375) (22.277) (3.262) 
Observations 1,653 1,653 1,653 8,669 8,669 8,669 
R-squared 0.239 -0.273 0.235 0.262 0.244 0.262 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include full 
controls as in Table 3. We replicate the results from the preferred specifications in the main analysis. The signs 





Table OA3. Heterogeneity Analysis by quartiles of Income from Donations/Grants 
Panel A. Estimates for 1st and 2nd quartiles 
 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS Lewbel OLS 2SLS Lewbel 
       
Charitable Spending 0.281 3.364 0.561 6.338*** -1.211 6.378*** 
 (0.788) (3.956) (0.836) (1.002) (1.331) (1.760) 
Interaction Term 2.618 -8.943 2.843 -31.142*** -7.158 -34.476*** 
 (7.620) (147.037) (5.861) (10.109) (5.068) (8.955) 
Governance Spending -5.773 4.568 -6.716** 21.718*** 2.250 23.186*** 
 (3.995) (7.726) (3.325) (5.558) (2.766) (5.404) 
Observations 1,653 1,653 1,653 8,669 8,669 8,669 
R-squared 0.239 -0.273 0.235 0.262 0.244 0.262 
Panel B. Estimates for 3rd and 4th quartiles 
 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 2SLS Lewbel OLS 2SLS Lewbel 
       
Charitable Spending 6.470*** 1.703 4.331** 1.780 2.417 3.248 
 (1.210) (1.174) (2.078) (1.691) (2.102) (2.357) 
Interaction Term -29.695** -13.788** -20.115 -5.330 -22.613 1.254 
 (12.222) (5.357) (12.302) (12.376) (28.018) (10.194) 
Governance Spending 24.346*** 8.556** 15.423** 11.151 12.279 10.984* 
 (6.945) (3.581) (6.884) (7.014) (11.870) (5.687) 
Observations 2,852 2,852 2,852 1,967 1,967 1,967 
R-squared 0.213 0.176 0.212 0.274 0.121 0.273 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The four quartiles are of 
Income from Donations/Grants. All specifications include full controls (except for the respective variable 
that the heterogeneity analysis is conducted on) as in Table 3. We replicate the results from the preferred 
specifications in the main analysis. The signs and significance of the estimates are generally similar to 
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